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FIDUCIARY FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Evan J. Criddle

*

An enduring challenge for administmtive law is the tension between the ideal
of democratic policymaking and the ubiquity of bureaucratic discretion. This Article
seeks to reframe the problem of agency discretion by outlining an interpretivist
model of administrative law based on the concept of fiduciary obligation in private
legal relations such as agency, trust, and corporation . Administrative law, like private fiduciary law, increasingly relies upon a tripartite framework of entrustment,
residual control, and fiduciary duty to demarcate a domain of bounded agency
discretion. To minimize the risk that agencies will abuse their entrusted discretion
through opportunism or carelessness , administrative law empowers the political
branches to exert limited residual control over agencies and subjects agencies to
nonderogable duties of care and loyalty. As an interpretivist theory, this fiduciary
model helps to explain controversial features of administrative law such as the
contemporary nondelegation doctrine, Chevron deference, and the limits of presidential control over agency action. By clarifying administrative law's internal
dynamics and implicit ambitions, the fiduciary model also provides a blueprint for
reform in critical areas such as the standing doctrine and the due process restraints
on agency discretion.
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INTRODUCTION

Enthusiasts have hailed the rise of the modem administrative state as "the
triumph of legitimate, liberal governance in a world full of dangerous alternatives."1 There is much to commend this view. Legislative enactments such
2
as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Federal Advisory
3
Committee Act (FACA) have greatly enhanced the administrative state's
transparency, formal rationality, and procedural fairness. Courts in the United
States have followed the U.S. Congress's lead, demanding that agencies
provide increasingly detailed and persuasive justifications for their discretionary policy decisions. Yet, at the same time that legislators and judges have
been dutifully fine-tuning agency procedure, legal theory's shifting currents

1.
Jerry L. Mashaw, SmaU Things Like Reasons Are Put in a]ar: Reason and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 27 (2001).
2.
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) .
3.
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2000)) .
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have gradually eroded the administrative state's conceptual foundations,
4
precipitating a "crisis of legitimacy" in administrative law .
Over the past century, administrative law scholars developed a variety of
theories for reconciling agency policymaking with the core principles of our
constitutional democracy. Early apologists envisioned Congress as the source
of all regulatory policy and characterized agencies either as mere transmission
belts for legislative directives or as dispassionate experts capable of translating
1
Congress's generalist instructions into specialized regulatory regimes. As legal
realism dampened enthusiasm for these technocratic theories of agency
action, new theories arose to take their place, each reflecting a vision of
agencies as political institutions embedded in the political process. The "interest representation" model emerged in the 1970s, emphasizing agencies' role as
facilitators of public deliberation and characterizing agency notice-and6
More
comment rulemaking as a microcosm of the democratic process.
recently, proponents of enhanced legislative oversight and executive power
have advanced "political-control"7 and "unitary-executive',a models of the
administrative state, seeking to anchor agency policymaking to the political
branches' constitutional and popular mandates. Each of these models has
aspired to reconcile agency administration with liberal constitutional values

4.
Peter H. Schuck, Introduction , in FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4 (Pe ter H.
Schuck ed., 1994); see, e.g., jOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1980) ;
)AMES 0. FREEDMAN , CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 78 (1978).
5.
See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1675-78 (1975); see also Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and ]uaicial Review, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 505 , 577-78 (1985) (describing these models); Robert B. Reich , Public Administration and
Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay , 94 YALE L.J . 1617, 1618 (1985) ("In the half-century
prior to the end of W orld War II , most Americans viewed public administrators as experts who
used the ir experience and training to discover the best means for attaining goals established by
statute. The administrator's task was merely to solve the problems identified by democratic
processes; the legitimacy of his role was no major issue.") (citation omitted).
6.
Stewart, supra note 5, at 1760--61; see also Garland, supra note 5, at 579 ("The interest
representation model evolved in response to widespread disillusionment with both the
'transmission belt' and 'expertise' models of administrative action."); Reich , supra no te 5, at !620
("The job of the public administrator, according to this vision, was to accommodate-to the
extent possible-the varying demands placed upon government by competing groups. The public
administrator was a referee, a skillful practitioner of negotiation and compromise.").
7.
See e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War
Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671 ( 1992); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry
R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243
(1987); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, The Political Origins of the
Administrative Procedure Act, IS J.L. ECON. & ORG. !80 (1999) .
8.
See, e.g. , Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Exe cutive,
48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995) ; Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural judiciary, lOS HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
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and rationalize administrative procedures by tracing agency policy to specific
directives from Congress, the president, or the people as a whole.
In the end, however, these descriptive models have struggled to deliver a
coherent explanation for a central feature of the administrative state: the
9
ubiquity of agency discretion. As legal realists have shown, the transmissionbelt and expertise models underestimate agencies' proactive role in the progressive development of regulatory policy. The interest-representation model
offers a more sophisticated strategy for taming agency discretion, but it, too,
has limited traction as a descriptive theory of administrative law because
agencies are not obligated to honor interest-group preferences in the rulemaking process. Even advocates of the interest-representation model readily concede that interest groups' "participation in such proceedings may have little
10
impact on agency policy determinations."
Nor does the political-control
model offer a persuasive descriptive account of agency discretion. In a variety
of contexts, administrative law significantly restrains the president's control
over administrators and thereby insulates agency decisions from the political
process. Although Congress could theoretically redesign the administrative
state to draw all agency operations more firmly under the president's direct
command and control, this would require drastic reconstructive surgery to
semi-autonomous "independent". agencies and adjudicatory tribunals. In short,
none of the descriptive models advanced to date fully captures the role of
agency discretion in the legal architecture of the administrative state.
This Article seeks to reframe the problem of agency discretion in administrative law by exploring the thematic and doctrinal parallels between administrative law's regulation of agency discretion and the legal constraints on
fiduciaries in priyate legal relations such as trust, agency, partnership, guardianship, and corporation. Fiduciary metaphors have long played a prominent
role in the rhetoric of administrative law jurisprudence, but the influence of
this rhetorical tradition in the development of administrative law has eluded
critical analysis. The basic insight of this Article is that administrative law's
metaphorical fiduciary foundations can no longer be dismissed as mere rhetoric;
rather, public law increasingly draws upon fiduciary law's three foundational
elements as a conceptual framework for constraining agency discretion and
mediating relationships between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

9.
See jERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC jUSTICE 1 (1983) (noting administrative law's
legitimacy crisis and describing the history of American administrative law as a "history of failed
ideas"); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in che Administrative
State, 78 N .Y.U. L. REV. 461,469 (2003) (reviewing and critiquing these models) .
10.
Stewart, supra note 5, at 1775.
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The emerging "fiduciary model" in administrative law posits that administrative agencies are endowed with authority to set regulatory policy when
Congress and the president, acting jointly as proxy settlors for the sovereign
people, entrust them with regulatory discretion over an area of public concern. While agency discretion may enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of public governance, it also gives rise to "agency costs"-monitoring
and bonding expenditures and losses arising from the divergence between the
public interest and agency practice. To minimize the risk that agencies will
abuse their discretion through opportunism or negligence, each political
branch monitors agency activity and retains some residual control to correct
agency mismanagement. Agencies also are bound by a duty of fidelity to
their statutory mandates, and duties of care and loyalty to their statutory
beneficiaries. I argue that the fiduciary model of entrustment, residual control,
and fiduciary duty offers a lucid lens for examining the role of agency
discretion in contemporary administrative law because it deftly interweaves
the law's disparate thematic strands--delegation, discretion, fidelity, rationality, impartiality, and accountability-into a coherent and intelligible whole. 11
While entrustment and residual control are familiar leitmotifs in administrative law jurisprudence, the same cannot be said for agency fiduciary
duties. Certainly, courts do not routinely describe agency obligations in the
lofty rhetoric of fiduciary duty; rather, agencies' legal duties to act prudently,
impartially, and without undue self-interest have emerged incrementally over
time as "due process" or "arbitrary and capricious" restraints on agency discretion. In practice, however, these constitutional and quasi-constitutional
standards radiate a similar aura of moral authority and serve similar functions-namely, to deter breaches of the public trust and spur agencies to
internalize vital social norms such as impartiality, rationality, and, most
importantly, fidelity. The fiduciary model shows that administrative agencies'
emerging fiduciary duties complement the political branches' residual
controls and reinforce the social norms that shape agency behavior.
As an interpretivist theory, the fiduciary model makes a valuable contribution to contemporary criticism in administrative law by clarifying
11.
A few scholars have used simple principal-agent models to explore the "agency costs"
incurred when the U.S. Congress and the president delegate authority to agencies. See, e.g., D.
RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION 24-25
(1991); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of
Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239 (1989); Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the
Deterioration of Regulatory Policy , 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1994). In contrast to the fiduciary model
advanced here, these principal-agent models posit either Congress or the president as the
relation's sole "principal" and focus on the political branches' tools of residual control without
considering the other legal and social norms that shape agency action.
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the principles and policies that underpin enigmatic legal doctrines. For
example, the fiduciary model suggests that the contemporary nondelegation
doctrine, which theoretically limits Congress's authority to delegate lawmaking
authority, might be best understood as a minimalist rule of prudent administration akin to the "prudent-investor" rule in trust law. Likewise, the controversial theory of legislative delegation, which grounds judicial deference to
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, comes into sharper relief when
viewed against the backdrop of agencies' residual political controls and fiduciary duties. The fiduciary concept also helps explain the APA's standards for
judicial review of agency informal rulemaking, adjudication, and choice of
policymaking procedures. In each of these contexts, the fiduciary model envisions administrative agencies as stewards exercising discretion on behalf of
their statutory beneficiaries, subject to the traditional fiduciary duties of care,
loyalty, and transparency.
The balance of this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a general
overview of contemporary fiduciary law, elaborating fiduciary relations'
characteristic elements of entrustment, residual control, and fiduciary duty.
Part II applies this model to the administrative state, demonstrating that
fiduciary law and administrative law bear strikingly similar features and
perform analogous functions. Part III disaggregates the fiduciary model, exploring
ways in which the binary principal-agent paradigm of administrative entrustment, which has long dominated legal and political theory, fails to capture
administrative law's flexible approach to agencies' structural and functional
diversity. Specifically, I argue that other paradigmatic fiduciary relations such
as trust, guardianship, and corporation may serve as useful alternative paradigms for independent agencies, government corporations, and other administrative institutions.
By illuminating administrative law's internal dynamics and implicit ambitions, the fiduciary model also promises a practical payoff: It reveals areas where
the law could be refined to enhance agency fidelity. As an illustration, Part IV
explores two normative implications of the fiduciary model that enjoy broad
acceptance in private law but have yet to take hold in administrative law. First, I
argue that courts should expand Article III "injury-in-fact" standing where
agency action prevents the agency's statutory beneficiaries from protecting their
rights through the democratic process, provided that beneficiaries establish their
adequacy as class representatives. Second, courts should enforce agencies' due
process duties of care and loyalty more vigorously in settings where the agency
costs of administrative governance are likely to be highest (for example, where
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the president lacks effective control over agency policymaking). These measures would reinforce the fiduciary norms implicit in agency entrustment.
Before setting out along this path, let me first clarify one point to avoid
confusion: Although the fiduciary model advanced in this Article boasts significant advantages over previous positive models of the administrative state, I
harbor no illusions that the model might serve as a silver bullet for administrative law's legitimacy crisis. Since agency "legitimacy" is a contested concept
resting on other contested concepts such as "democratic accountability" and
"the mle of law," agency legitimacy is, and always wilt be, an ongoing
11
national debate. Moreover, care must be exercised to ensure that comparisons between administrative law and fiduciary law, "starting as devices to
13
liberate thought," do not "end . . . by enslaving it." Keeping these limits in
mind, however, the fiduciary model remains highly useful as a "device" for
disclosing the values implicit in current administrative law doctrines, refocusing debates over agency legitimacy, and thereby fostering interpretive
communities. The fiduciary model reveals, for example, that administrative
law incorporates multiple conceptions of agency fidelity, from pluralist majoritarianism to communitarian commitment reinforcement. The fiduciary model
also suggests that some doctrines that have become flashpoints in
administrative law's perceived legitimacy crisis (for example, the nondelegation doctrine and agency independence) may be less problematic than they
initially appear--or, more accurately, problematic in ways that are different
from what critics generally assume. The fiduciary model thus serves as an invitation to discussion rather than a suppressant to current debates over the
legal, political, and social legitimacy of the administrative state.

l.

THE ARCHITECfURE OF FIDUCIARY LAW

In a sense, the fiduciary concept is the oldest and most familiar model of
the administrative state. The rhetoric of fiduciary obligation permeates western

12.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the C onstitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787
(2005) (outlining three conceptions of constitutional legitimacy: legal, sociological, and moral);
Dan M. Kahan , Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CAROOZO L. REV. 795 (1999) (reviewing seve ral
competing conceptions of"democracy" in administrative law) .
13.
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. O:l., ISS N.E. 58,61 (N .Y. 1926). In a previous article, I critiqued
the U.S. Supreme Court's reliance upon contract metaphor in treaty interpretation. See Evan Criddle,
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431,
450-55 (2004).
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political theory, from Cicero's discourses On Moral Obligation, to Locke's
Two Treatises of Govemment, 15 to the seminal Federalist Papers.16 American
legal rhetoric has internalized the metaphor of government officials and institutions as "agents and trustees" 17 of popular sovereignty to such an extent that
the terms "administrator" and "administrative agency" rarely arouse sustained
critical reflection. Yet the fiduciary concept's pervasive influence in American
political theory and legal rhetoric should not obscure the concept's role in
defining the "deep structure" of administrative law. As a starting point in excavating the fiduciary foundations of administrative law, this part briefly reviews
the fiduciary concept's history, foundational elements, and interplay with
social norms.
Legal historians trace the fiduciary concept's genesis to the Roman fiducia or fidei-commissia, 18 or, in Anglo-American law, to the rise of trusts in the
19
Middle Ages. Over time, the trust developed into a favored legal device for
14.
See, e.g., OCERO, ON MORAL OBLIGATION bk. I, ch. 25, § 85, at 69 (John Higginbotham
trans., Faber & Faber 1976) ("The guardianship of the state is a kind of trusteeship which should always
be managed to the advantage of the person entrusted rather than of those to whom he is entrusted.").
15.
See, e.g., jOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, §§ 77-79, 107--09,
119-22, 136, 229-30 (Legal Classics Library 1994) (1698); see also E. Mabry Rogers & Stephen B.
Young, Public Office as a Public Trusr: A Suggestion rluu Impeachment far High Crimes and
Misdemeanors Implies a Fiduciary Standard, 63 GEO. L.J. 1025, 1026 (1975) ("To formulate a new
theory of constitutional government calling for restrained public authority, Locke ... rel ied upon
the concept of a trust to limit governmental power to the exercise of those specific functions
delegated to the Government .... [T)he Government's power should be encumbered with a trust
to act on behalf of the beneficiaries-all those who had created government by the social
contract."); id. at 1049 ("Lord Hardwicke held in 1742, the fiduciary obligations of officers are
uniform regardless of whether they exercise their powers in a public or a private capacity.")
(referring to Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 A.T.K. 400,406 (1742)); J.C. Shepherd, Note, Towards a
Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L.Q. REV. 51, 76 (1981) ("In the area of public
officials, for example, as early as John Locke it was conceived that the fiduciary duty of
representatives was the result of a conditional delegation of power.") (citation omitted) .
16.
See , e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the
people, constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes.") ; THE FEDERALIST
No. 65, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The delicacy and magnitude
of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in
the administration of public affairs speak for themselves.").
THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
17.
See ERNEST VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY
18.
RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS 1 (3d ed. 1955) (explaining that the Latin "fiduciarius"
denotes "a trustee or one in a position of trust and as used in our law denotes anyone who holds
the character of a trustee, or character analogous thereto").
See Jerry W . Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE
19.
DAME L. REV. 199, 207--08 (1992). Even before the trust, the fiduciary concept resurfaced with
the "use" in twelfth- and thirteenth-century England. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS§§ 1.3-1 .8, at 12-28 (William Franklin Fratcher ed.,
4thed. 1987).
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conveyances of property because it empowered persons to "split the atom" of
personal property rights between legal and equitable title. Trustees could
obtain legal title to trust assets and responsibility for the assets' day-to-day
administration, while beneficiaries-the cestui que trust-could acquire equitable title, including the right to enjoy the fruit of the trustee's labors. In its
early history, however, the trust covered a much broader field of confidential
relations. Courts of equity employed the trust concept whenever a party
undertook "to exercise a power, to conduct a sale, to supervise an estate or
20
business, or in some other way to become [another's] employee or agent."
As stewards for trust beneficiaries, trustees were expected to manage assets or
perform other services in a conscientious manner, manifesting unqualified
21
fidelity to their beneficiaries' interests.
Over the centuries, Anglo-American courts gradually extended the
fiduciary concept from trusts to a host of other private relations, including
agency, partnerships, guardianships, conservatorships, receiverships, bailments,
corporations, joint ventures, equitable charges, security arrangements, venture
capital, strategic alliances, franchising, and certain counseling relations such
22
as the attorney-client relationship. More recently, the rhetoric of fiduciary
obligation also seems to be taking root in the legal obligations of parents, educators, physicians, psychiatrists, clergymen, and a variety of other confidential
21
associations. Although this burgeoning field of "fiduciary law" remains very
much a work in progress, there are strong indications "that our society is
24
evolving into one based predominantly on fiduciary relations."
The fiduciary concept, like many other dynamic common law concepts,
25
is not easily reduced to rote definition. Its slipperiness arises, in part, from its
common law genealogy. Courts have eschewed formalistic criteria for identifying fiduciary relations and instead reason by analogy to paradigmatic
relations such as trust, partnership, and agency. This case-by-case, analogical

20.
L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69.
21.
See Charles E. Rounds, Fiduciary Liability of Trustees and Personal Representatives,
853 TAX MGMT. A-3 (2003) ("[E]quity accepts the common law ownership of the trustee, but
regards it as against conscience for him to exercise that legal ownership otherwise than for the
benefit of the cestui que trust, and therefore engrafts the equitable obligation upon him.")
(quoting G.W. KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 95 (6th ed. 1965)).
See Markham, supra note 19, at 214 (chronicling this expansion).
22.
See, e.g., Brett G. Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework for Understanding
23.
and Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties of Educators, BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159 (2005); Elizabeth S. Scott
& Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995).
24.
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 798 ( 1983 ).
25.
See 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 19, § 2.3, at 40 (noting that legal concepts would
lack practical value if they could be easily reduced to exact definitions).
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approach has led some scholars to characterize fiduciary law-like
26
administrative law-as an "atomistic" field resistant to unified theory.
While the fiduciary concept resists essentialization, three elements are
generally considered to be foundational for all fiduciary relations: entrustment,
residual control, and fiduciary duties.

A.

Fiduciary Entrustment

The starting point for all fiduciary relations is substitution: Fiduciaries stand
27
in as stewards with discretion over an aspect of their beneficiaries' welfare. Most
fiduciaries-including agents, partners, and trustees-acquire their authority
through a consensual delegation from dependants. O:msent and reliance are not
prerequisites for fiduciary relations, however. In some circumstances, the
common law treats persons in confidential relations as fiduciaries even if they
were not authorized through an actual delegation from one holding authority.
Guardianships are one obvious example: Minors and incompetents do not
ordinarily delegate authority to their guardians to act on their behalf, but
fiduciary law nonetheless imputes an entrustment of fiduciary authority to
guardians and relies upon these fiduciaries to act in the best interests of their
28
wards. Even in the absence of express or implied consent, courts superimpose
the fiduciary concept "wherever special confidence is reposed, whether the
relationship be that of blood, business, friendship, or association," rendering
29
the beneficiary vulnerable to abuse of trust. Thus, the hallmark of fiduciary
relations is not delegation per se, but rather the law's ex post identification of a
confidential relation as one founded on trust.
One reason why trust lies at the heart of all fiduciary relations is that
fiduciaries cannot exercise complete control or ensure comprehensive monitoring of fiduciaries' actions without negating the fiduciary relation's efficiencies. Monitoring costs may be high due to fiduciary specialization and the
difficulty of reducing fiduciary responsibilities to objective performance measures. Entrustors necessarily rely upon fiduciaries to perform their duties
honorably, rendering the desired services in good faith without exploiting

26.
See Shepherd, supra note 15, at 53 (reviewing various theories of fiduciary relations).
See REsTA TFMENr (THIRD) OF TRusrs § 2 cmt. b (2003) ("[O]ne characteristic ... common
2 7.
to all [fiduciary relations is that] a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is under a duty to act
for the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relationship.").
See generally Scott & Scott, supra note 23.
28.
29.
Dawson v. Nat'! Life Ins. Co. of the U.S., 157 N.W. 929, 933 (Iowa 1916).
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beneficiaries' vulnerability for personal gain. Thus, fiduciary entrustment
is predicated upon the expectation of fiduciary fidelity .
The scope of fiduciary discretion varies significantly. In many employment relationships, for example, employees exercise discretion only when
employers are unable to capture all significant terms of their employment
11
contract with sufficient specificity. Shareholder-director relations fall closer
to the opposite end of the spectrum. In public corporations, directors often
enjoy sweeping discretion to set corporate policy and to appoint or remove
corporate officers. This discretion does not arise solely from shareholders'
inability to reduce their responsibilities to fixed contractual terms; rather,
shareholders deliberately delegate policymaking duties to directors in order to
mediate conflicts with corporate officers and take advantage of directors'
experience and expertise. Whereas many employers view employee discretion as a necessary evil, corporations--even in the skittish post-Enron
environment--embrace director discretion as a tool for maximizing shareholder profits. In short, the scope of fiduciary discretion reflects a variety of
contextual factors, including the purpose of the entrustment and the perceived trustworthiness of the particular fiduciary.
By law, a fiduciary's authority extends no further than necessary for the
12
performance of its entrusted function. A tmstee's managerial responsibilities, for example, are limited to the discrete assets identified in the terms of
trust. Similarly, the "trust relation between the shareholders and the directors of a corporation ... usually extends ... only to the management of the
31
general affairs of the corporation, with a view to dividends of profits."
Courts enforce these limits on fiduciary discretion to prevent unnecessary
encroachments on beneficiaries' autonomy.

30.

Faith, 94

See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
L. REV. 369, 392 ( 1980) ("Such reliance plausibly is h<~sed on the simple belief

HARV.

that the party with discretion in performance will keep the contract, and therefore will not use its
discretion to rec<lpt ure forgone opportunities."); Lawre nce E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty
in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1684 (1990) ("The dependent 's reliance upon the
power ho lder or, not quite conversely, the power holder's service as a surrogate for the dependent,
characterizes the fiduciary relationship.").
See Charles]. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Conrracrs, 67 VA. L. REV. I 089,
31.
1091 (1981) ("[Djefinitive obligations may be impractical because of inability to identify uncertain
future conditions or because of in<~bility to characterize complex adaptations adequate ly even
when the contingencies themselves can be identified in advance.").
32 .
Franke l, supra note 24, at 809 n.48; see aLso Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation,
2 5 U. TORONTO L.J. I, I0 ( 1975) ("The extent of the fiduciary's discretion is demarcated, a nd the
fiduci ary <'bligat.ion is imposed in order to compel a proper exercise of that discretion within the
scope of the authority thus deline<~ted.").
33.
Dawson, 157 N.W. at 932 (quoting Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 581 (N .Y. 1868)).
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Fiduciary Accountability: Residual Control and Fiduciary Duties

The fiduciary concept presumes that fiduciaries will manifest altruism
34
(or, at very least, honesty) in the exercise of their entrusted authority. Fiduciary relations stand or fall on "the fiduciary's commitment to abandon self35
interest and promote her beneficiary's welfare instead of her own." The dark
side of fiduciary discretion, of course, is that it places beneficiaries in a position of acute vulnerability. Allowing fiduciaries to substitute for beneficiaries
poses the risk that fiduciaries may behave opportunistically, misappropriating
valuable resources or opportunities. They may devote insufficient energy to a
delegated task or behave negligently or recklessly, dissipating entrusted
resources, squandering opportunities, or injuring third parties. Furthermore,
as recent corporate scandals illustrate all too vividly, fiduciaries often have
both the opportunities and incentives to conceal their malfeasance from
beneficiaries to avoid legal sanctions and public censure. Beneficiaries who are
able to monitor fiduciary conduct may lack the expertise or experience to
evaluate a fiduciary's performance effectively. The dangers posed by fiduciary
36
entrustment are thus at least as great as the potential benefits.
If fiduciary entrustment relies upon a naively sanguine view of human
nature, other aspects of fiduciary law view this relation with a jaundiced
eye. To compensate for the potential divergence of interests between fiduciaries and beneficiaries, fiduciary law seeks to deter fiduciary malfeasance
through a combination of hard and soft accountability mechanisms: residual
control, judicial review, and socialization. First, fiduciary law holds fiduciaries
accountable for failing to meet their commitments by honoring the entrustors'

34.
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of
the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 438-39 (2001); Frankel, supra note 24, at 832 ("By
characterizing the fiduciary as an altruistic person, the courts emphasize and highlight the
substitution aspect of the fiduciary relation, reassuring the entrustor that the fiduciary will act in
the entrustor's interest."); Mitchell, supra note 30, at 1687 ("(T]he law assumes a high degree of
altruism on the part of the fiduciary.").
35.
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1783 (2001).
See Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138,
36.
160 (1999) ("Th[e] need for dynamic management precludes the possibility of dictating the
behavior of the fiduciary by specific and easily enforceable rules."); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial
Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985)
(discussing the threat of fiduciary opportunism); Goetz & Scott, supra note 31, at 1129 ("The
fiduciary is in control of the level of efforts expended on the client's behalf; a conflict of interests
over the proper level of efforts ... predictably will arise."); Scott & Scott, supra note 23, at 2420
("(B]eneficiaries-whether shareholders, trust beneficiaries or legatees-are presumed to lack the
requisite information or expertise to understand and evaluate the fiduciary's performance, and
acquiring such information is very costly.").
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residual equitable rights to intervene under certain limited circumstances.
Second, the common law imposes certain basic duties on fiduciaries, which, if
violated, give rise to a presumption of malfeasance and empower courts to nullify fiduciary judgments. Third, legal rules reinforce preexisting social norms so
as to encourage voluntary norm-internalization. Each of these bonding mechanisms deters opportunism and waste, encourages beneficial socialization, and
equips beneficiaries to discern ravenous wolves masquerading in sheep's clothing.
1.

Residual Control

Residual-control rights are one mechanism for promoting fidelity. Even
after entrustors delegate authority to fiduciaries, they reserve the right to
supervise fiduciary performance and, in appropriate circumstances, to take
corrective action to remedy fiduciary malfeasance-for example, by revoking
fiduciaries' discretionary judgments or withdrawing entrusted authority.
Some legal scholars have viewed these residual-control rights as "the defining
11
attribute of fiduciary relationships."
Residual-control rights are not all created equal, however. In agency
relations, most principals may intervene at will to correct agency misman18
agement and may dismiss agents without advance notice or legal fanfare . Not
so for trustees. To remove a prodigal trustee, beneficiaries must seek judicial
intervention and show that the proposed removal is authorized by the trust
19
terms or justified by "cause." Judicial standards for interfering with a trustee's exercise of "discretionary power" are similarly stringent; courts will not
disturb a trust except "to prevent misinterpretation or abuse of the discretion
by t h e trustee. !140
Strong policy considerations counsel beneficiaries against contracting
for agency-style control in relations where fiduciaries exercise trustee-style
discretion. Fiduciary discretion tends to be greatest in relations where beneficiaries rely on fiduciaries to employ specialized skills or utilize context-specific
knowledge. In corporations, enhanced discretion may also reflect fiduciaries'
crucial role as mediator between competing classes of beneficiaries or
between the beneficiaries as a whole and other stakeholders such as corporate

37.
See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Crirical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Dury, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1399,
1405 (2002).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 406 ( 1958).
38.
39.
RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 37 (2003); LEWIS M. SIMES, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THELAW OFFIDUCIA RY ADMINISTRATION91 (1941) .
40.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50.
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management. Under such circumstances, beneficiaries intentionally abdicate
a greater measure of control to fiduciaries, recognizing that even the most
well-intentioned interference with fiduciary performance may inadvertently
stymie productivity.
On the other hand, courts do not ordinarily enforce agreements that
preclude beneficiaries from exerting any residual control over fiduciaries. The
Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains that "[i]t is contrary to sound policy, and
a contradiction in terms, to permit the settlor to relieve a 'trustee' of all
accountability .... Even under the broadest grant of fiduciary discretion, a
42
trustee must act honestly and in a state of mind contemplated by the settlor."
2.

Fiduciary Duties

Fiduciary duties offer a complementary mechanism for promoting fiduciary accountability. As an ethical and legal imperative, fiduciaries are to act
"primarily for the benefit of [their beneficiaries] in matters connected with
[the] undertaking," performing their designated roles with due diligence and
43
unqualified fidelity. In traditional legal parlance, these responsibilities are
grouped under two general headings: the "duty of loyalty" and the "duty of
care.'.+4 Since these two general duties apply to diverse types of fiduciary relations, their precise application is necessarily context dependent. Courts
enforce the duties of loyalty and care to encourage prudent exercise of
entrusted authority and to prevent fiduciaries from reaping personal benefit
from self-interested transactions unless the beneficiaries expressly authorize
45
the breach. Although fiduciary duties may, in some instances, be modified or
46
abrogated by contract, courts tend to treat these duties as nonnegotiable.
Fiduciary duties complement beneficiaries' residual-control rights, granting
fiduciaries broad latitude to set discretionary policies but ensuring that these
policies do not transgress reasonable limits.

41.
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247,271 (1999).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 50 cmt. c.
42 .
43.
Nagel v. Todd, 45 A.2d 326,327-28 (Md. 1946) (quoting REsTATEMENT OF AGENCY§ 13
cmt. a (1933)); see also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N .E. 545,548 (N.Y. 1928) (describing this "rule
of undivided loyalty" as "relentless and supreme").
44.
Some courts have hinted that there might be an analytically distinct "duty of good
faith," but the attributes of this nascent duty are not entirely clear. E.g., In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., No. Civ. A. 15452,2005 WL 2056651 , at *35 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) .
See Blair & Stout, supra note 35 , at 1782~3 .
45 .
46.
See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust
Law at Century's End, 88 CALL. REv. 1877, 1911 (2000).
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a.

The Duty of Loyalty

The duty of undivided loyalty obligates fiduciaries to act "solely in the
interest of the beneficiary" without giving consideration to personal advantage.47 Fiduciaries may not conclude transactions that engender conflicts of
interests with their beneficiaries. Judicial decisions give this duty a prophylactic
edge: Fiduciaries are prohibited from consummating self-interested transactions
without beneficiaries' informed authorization even if the transactions were for
48
fair market value and did not adversely affect the beneficiaries' interests. If a
fiduciary enters into a self-interested transaction without making full disclosure
to the beneficiary and obtaining the beneficiary's approval, or if the transaction
is otherwise unfair to the beneficiary, the beneficiary may ask a court in
equity to void the transaction, impose a constructive trust, and compel the
49
fiduciary to disgorge any profits obtained from the transaction. Courts may
also enjoin fiduciaries from using beneficiaries' property or privileges for an
unau thorized, self-serving purpose.
Where a fiduciary relation involves multiple beneficiaries, the duty of
loyalty takes on an antidiscrimination aspect: Unless otherwise provided for
by contract, fiduciaries are bound to render an equal measure of fidelity to each
beneficiary. An exercise of discretion that facially augments one beneficiary's
interests at another's expense is as much a breach of fiduciary duty as a selfinterested transaction.
b.

The Duty of Care

In addition to the duty of loyalty, fiduciaries bear a duty to exercise reasonable care in performing their services for beneficiaries. Courts generally characterize this duty as an iteration of the prudent-steward standard; fiduciaries
. tas ks m
. "good f att
. h ," 50 use "best euorts,
a:
" 51 or exeretse
.
" sue h
must pe rform t h etr
47.
John H. Langbein, The Conrracrarian Basis of the Law of Trusts , 105 YALE L.J. 625, 655
(1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959) ); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (describing fiduciaries' obligation to beneficiaries primarily
as a duty "to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency").
See Langbein, supra note 4 7, at 655-56.
48.
49.
See 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra n ote 19, § 2.5, at 43; see also Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 (1980) (holding that constructive trust and disgorgement are
appropria te remed ies for a fiduciary's breach of trust) .
50.
Roberr Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary RelacionshifJ: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1049 & n.8 (1991).
51.
/d .; see, e.g., Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods lnt'l, Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 172
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (reg<~rding implied duty to use best efforts); Wood v. Lucy, L<~dy Duff-Gordon,
11 8 N.E. 214, 215 (N.Y. 1917) (regarding implied reasonable effom in contractual reli!tionships).
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care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with
52
his own property."
In practice, however, courts do not ordinarily hold
fiduciaries personally liable for actions within the scope of their discretion (as
opposed to actions outside their vested authority) absent a showing that the
actions were grossly negligent or reckless, rather than merely unreasonable or
53
imprudent. Thus, the duty of care requires fiduciaries to take and preserve a
beneficiary's property, to defend legal actions against the fiduciary relation, to
pay income due to the beneficiaries, and to inform themselves of all material
information reasonably available prior to making an important decision.
Unlike the duty of loyalty, the duty of care is not prophylactic; beneficiaries
must demonstrate that they have suffered cognizable injury from the fiduci54
ary's failure to meet the requisite standard of care.
c.

Recordkeeping and Accounting Duties

From the general duties of loyalty and care, courts have extrapolated a
series of subsidiary duties that share elements of both duties and operate as
prophylactic rules. These include the duty "to keep clear and accurate
55
accounts," the duty to give beneficiaries a complete and accurate account56
ing of their performance when requested, and the duty to keep beneficiaries'
57
property separate from the fiduciary's personal property. Each of these duties
decreases beneficiaries' monitoring costs and enhances their ability to detect
and deter breaches of trust. Fiduciaries must satisfy these duties whether or
58
not the beneficiaries can demonstrate actual injury.

C.

Fiduciary Socialization

Although fiduciaries are accountable for flagrant abuses of trust, courts
generally tum a blind eye to garden-variety indiscretions. Fiduciary law is not
necessarily indifferent to less egregious forms of fiduciary misbehavior, but it
recognizes that formal accountability mechanisms can also have deleterious

52.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 174; see also 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note
19, § 2.5, at 43 (discussing this standard) .
53.
See Rounds, supra note 21, at A-4 ("The current state of the default law is to limit the
trustee's o r personal representative's personal exposure in tort to situations where the trustee is
personally at fault. ").
54.
See Langbein, supra note 47 , at 656.
55.
2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 19, § 172, at 452 .
56.
Id. § 172, at 454-56.
57 .
See SIMES, supra note 39, at 215 .
58.
See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV . 456 (2004 ).
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effects. Overenforcing fiduciary duties can diminish fiduciary relations' effectiveness by stifling expert innovation or deterring reasonable risk taking.
Fiduciaries may be more likely to shirk their obligations if they perceive that
shirking has become the status quo. Beneficiaries may lose faith in their fiduciaries and commit more resources to monitoring, defeating the fiduciary relation's erstwhile efficiencies. Thus, fiduciary relations' utility and viability
19
ultimately tum upon the perception of fiduciary fidelity.
To preserve the fragile environmental conditions where trust can survive
and thrive, fiduciary law works "in concert with extralegal influences,"
60
reinforcing, rather than displacing, pre-existing rules of moral conduct. For
this reason, it is not uncommon for judicial opinions to adopt a sennonizing
tone when discussing fiduciary duties, as in then-Judge Cardozo's classic
statement that fiduciaries owe their beneficiaries a duty of "finest loyalty .. .
stricter than the morals of the market place" or the "punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive.',;' Fiduciaries must manifest "undivided and unselfish loyalty"
and "utmost good faith," and they must conform their actions to "the highest
62
standards of honor and honesty." Such uncompromising moralistic rhetoric
61
may seem excessive as a description of fiduciaries' legal obligations, but it
has great practical value, reinforcing the extralegal aspirational norms that
shape fiduciary behavior. In the words of Edward Rock, fiduciary law "evolves

59.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 35 , at 1798 (describing the business-judgment rule "as a
'second best' solution to the problem of opportunism in corporate relationshi ps-a so lution that
recognizes that corporate law influences behavior not just by imposing sanctions but also by shaping
perceptions of what sort of behavior is expected, appropriate, a nd common").
60.
Scott & Scott, supra note 23, at 2476.
61.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,546 (N.Y. 1928).
62.
Davis, supra note 36, at 1-2 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)
(describing the duty of loyalty as a "rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily
and inexorably, the most scrupu lous observance of his duty"); Grossberg v. H<Jffenberg, 11 N.E.Zd 359,
360 (Ill. 1937)).
63.
Contmctarians who view fiduciary duties as mer<;: default t<;:rms have derided tht!n judge Cardozo's formulation, <~rguing that "the underlying deal" may not "support[ I th [is] level of
fiduciary obligation." Langbein, supra note 4 7, at 658; see, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein,
Opting Ouc of Fiduciary Duties: A Response w che Anri-Contraccarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 71-72
(1990); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Oucy, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 425,
426-27 (1993 ). Anti-contractarians argue that fiduciary duties cannot plausibly he characterized
as mere default contract rules because courts routinely enforce these duti es as mandatory standards
irrespective of the contracting parties' agreements.
See , e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1403-10 ( 1985 );
Roberr C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS 55, 60-61
(John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhause r eels., 1985); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of
Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV . 146l (1989).
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primarily at the level of norms rather than the level of rules'!64 and influences
fiduciary performance "not primarily by threatening liability but by expressing
65
and reinforcing social norms of careful and loyal behavior."
Fiduciary law thus serves an important expressive function, conveying
society's aspirations for fiduciary diligence and loyalty. Courts encourage fiduciaries to view their role as a call to service, drawing motivation from a spirit
of duty and honor as much as from a fear of coercion or sanctions. These "soft"
norms accomplish something that "hard" fiduciary law cannot: They decrease
the need for judicial intervention by enhancing the reputational rewards of
fiduciary fidelity. As Elizabeth and Robert Scott have observed, fiduciary
entrustment "invokes respect in the community, signaling that the individual
has assumed an important responsibility, and is trustworthy and morally
upright. Community recognition of these attributes carries its own reward,
enhancing the nonpecuniary value of the fiduciary role.'t66 Fiduciary relations
function most effectively, therefore, when legal constraints operate in concert
with social norms to promote fidelity.

D.

Balancing Fiduciary Discretion

In this rough sketch of fiduciary law, the architecture of fiduciary relations emerges as a delicate dialectic of trust and distrust, discretion and
accountability, hard legal rules and soft social norms. Fiduciary law honors
entrustment, allowing fiduciaries to exercise discretion within the scope of
their prescribed authority. But the law also reinforces the heightened expectations for fiduciary behavior by calibrating beneficiaries' residual control and
fiduciary duties to reduce the threat of opportunism and waste. Placing too
much emphasis on any one element of fiduciary relations-say, beneficiary
control or fiduciary duty-could prove counterproductive if it interferes with
fiduciary expertise or gives rise to a perception of fiduciary untrustworthiness.
The architecture of fiduciary law depends, therefore, upon courts cautiously
calibrating and recalibrating fiduciary duties and beneficiaries' control to preserve the balance between competing pressures, incentives, and values.

64.
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1097 (1997).
65 .
Blair & Scout, supra note 35, at 1794 ("[D)irectorial care is largely driven by social
norms, rather than by the threat of liability . ... ")(citing Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and
Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1265 (1999)); Rock, supra note 64, at 1016 ("Delaware
courts generate in the first instance the legal standards . .. which influence the development of
the social norms of directors [and) officers .... ").
66.
Scott & Score, supra note 23, at 2429.
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In the end, fiduciary law's perceived legitimacy depends upon its efficacy: Does the law's mix of entrustment, residual control, and fiduciary duties
promote fiduciary care and loyalty in a particular context? Opinions will differ,
of course, on where the law should strike this balance. Some policymakers
might prefer to increase fiduciary discretion and risk malfeasance so as to
maximize the fiduciary relation's potential efficiencies. Others might choose to
strengthen beneficiaries' residual control or fiduciary duties at the expense of
fiduciary efficiency and expertise. Because different fiduciary relations involve
different types of discretion, the balance between entrustment, residual control,
and fiduciary duties necessarily varies from one fiduciary relation to another.
Efforts to enhance the legitimacy of fiduciary relations thus necessitate
engagement with the fiduciary concept's contextual and normative dimensions.

II.

TOWARD A FIDUCIARY MODEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Administrative law, like private fiduciary law, vests individuals and institutions with authority to perform services for beneficiaries. Delegation may
enhance government's specialization and responsiveness, but it also generates
opportunities for corruption, factionalism, arbitrariness, and waste-the
67
enduring hazards of fiduciary representation.
In light of these important
commonalities between public and private law, courts often envision the
administrative state, "in its own way, [a]s the people's ... fiduciary for certain
68
purposes." This view of government officers and institutions as public fiduciaries is not "mere metaphor," according to some courts, but rather "a living
. ,,69
tenet o f our sooety.
67.
See Robert 0. Keohane, Governance in a Partially Globalized World, 95 AM. PoL SCI. REV. I, I
(2001) (coining the term "governance dilemma" to denote the difficulty that "[ajlthough institutions
are essential for human life, they are also dangerous").
Metro. W as h. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for th e Abate ment of Aircraft Noise,
68.
Inc ., 501 U.S. 252, 272 ( 1991) (quoting Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of
Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 385 ( 1976)); see also Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577 ( 1900)
(describing public offices as "mere agencies or trusts"); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820
( 1879) ("The power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the government .... The
people, in their sovereign capacity, have established their agencies for the preservation of the public
health and the public morals, and the protection of public and private rights."); Black River ReguiMing
Dist. v. Adirondack League Club, 121 N.E.2d 428, 433 (N.Y. 1954) (approving "the theory that the
power conferred by the Legislature is akin to that of a public trust to be exercised not for the benefit or
at the will of the trustee but for the commo n good").
69.
Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776--1787, at 546 ( 1969) (discussing the role of public
offic ials as "rulers and representatives ... at the same time"); Rogers & Young, supra note 15 , at
1029-30 ("The English Whigs and the American framers embraced the private law concept of trust
and extended its application even further in regul at ing public offices .... Just as citizens could give
their property in trust, the sovereign could give his offices in trust." ).
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The fiduciary concept's pervasive influence in administrative law merits
closer investigation. Traditionally, legal scholarship has viewed the law's
10
recourse to metaphor with skepticism, if not outright hostility. Yet scholarly
discomfort with "legal fictions" has not unsettled the private-law metaphors
that are embedded so deeply in the conceptual foundations of administrative
law. If anything, the venerable rhetoric of public institutions as "agencies"
headed by "administrators" and "officers," all exercising "delegated" authority
as a "public trust," has become more apt as a description of administrative law
doctrine over the last half-century. Fiduciary law's core elements of entrustment, residual control, and fiduciary duty increasingly capture the "deep
structure" of administrative law-from the glacial evolution of constitutional
precepts to the flowering of statutory standards for agency discretion.
Throughout administrative law jurisprudence, the· fiduciary model "triggers
powerful, recurring frameworks of meaning and patterns of belief ... [and]
sets in motion deeply rooted folk images, archetypes, and story lines," thereby
mediating the relationships between administrative agencies, the political
71
and judicial branches, and the people as a whole. Analyzing administrative
law from a fiduciary perspective thus illuminates the law's internal logic and
ambitions, and offers glimpses into administrative law's future .
A.

Administrative Entrustment

At its heart, administrative law governs the exercise of entrusted authority by institutions that serve as stewards for the people. The terms of an
administrative agency's enabling statute reflect the type and degree of trust
that the people, through their elected representatives, have chosen to repose
in the agency. Implicit in this public entrustment is the expectation that
agencies, like private-law fiduciaries, will align their performance with the
expressed and implicit interests of their beneficiaries, exercising their discretion to promote the beneficiaries' welfare. In theory, this marriage of agency
specialization, discretion, and fidelity should enhance the federal government's efficiency and responsiveness.

70.
See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 2 (1967) ("The fiction has generally been
regarded as something of which the law ought to be ashamed, and yet with which the law cannot,
as yet, dispense."); Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181,
186 (2004) ("Legal scholars have traditionally understood metaphor as, at worst, a perversion of
the law, and at best, a necessary but temporary place-holder for more fully developed lines of argument.
On this view, metaphors are vague and inherently manipulable, appealing to base instincts, whereas
explicit legal argumentation represents the rigorous, authentic core of law.").
71.
Tsai, supra note 70, at 189.
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Although virtually all agencies trace their authority to an express or
implied delegation from Congress, the scope of agencies' authority varies
dramatically. Some federal agencies have sweeping substantive missions and
enjoy correspondingly broad powers. The Federal Trade Commission Act, for
instance, authorizes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to take steps to
curb "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," but provides strikingly little guidance regarding what competitive
72
strategies would qualify as "unfair" or "deceptive." Such broadly phrased standards give agencies enormous flexibility to craft regulatory regimes responsive
to legislative policies in complex or changing circumstances.
To the extent that agencies are authorized to prescribe law through substantive rulemaking or adjudication, the agencies' determinations are
accorded legislative effect, meaning that they are binding not only for the
13
government but also for the public at large. Not all agencies have the power
to act with the force of law, however. Some agencies exercise investigatory
or reporting powers without the authority to promulgate legally binding
regulations or adjudicative decisions. Such agencies may engage in crusades of
public persuasion or may recommend that other agencies pursue a preferred
course of action. 14 Even where Congress does delegate regulatory authority to a
particular agency, it may choose to cabin the agency's discretion by prescribing narrow principles for implementation such as the specific qualification
75
criteria for government benefits.
However an administrative agency's responsibilities are defined, the
fiduciary model emphasizes that agencies bear a solemn responsibility to
honor the terms and spirit of their entrusted authority. Like private-law fiduciaries, agencies are expected to manifest fidelity to the trust reposed in them.
Courts have come to recognize over time that agencies must not only satisfy

72.
15 U.S. C. § 45(a)(2) (2000).
See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De Ia Cuesta, 458 U .S. 141 , 153 (1982)
73.
("Federal regulatio ns hav e no less pre-emptive effect [upon state law] than federal statutes.");
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981) (holding that the Secretary of Hea lth and
Human Services' interpret ive rules are "entitled to 'legislative effect' because, '[in] a situation of
this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility
for interpreting the statutory term."') (quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,425 (1977)).
74.
See Th om<~s W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I : From Nondelegacion co Exclusive
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2169 (2004) (citing the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's authority under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) to resolve complaints by conciliation).
75.
WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW§ 1.01 (4th ed. 2000);
see also I KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 6.3, <~t 234 (3d ed. 1994) ("[A]n agency has the power to issue binding legislative rules only if
and to the extent Congress has <~uthorized it to do so.").
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the strict terms of their statutory mandates (as prescribed in the transmissionbelt model) and investigate public preferences (as dictated by the interestrepresentation model), but also assume responsibility as fiduciaries for the
broader interests of their statutory beneficiaries. "While retaining the interest
representation model's concern with protecting regulatory beneficiaries, courts
have recognized that merely ensuring the participation of all affected interests
will not ensure the protection of those for whom Congress has expressed special
76
solicitude," Judge Merrick Garland of the D.C. Circuit has observed. Hence,
the courts have turned instead to an expanded notion of fidelity, one
that requires not only that the agencies not exceed their congressionally authorized powers, but also that they use those powers as Congress
intended. In short, the courts have reached back to the oldest of
administrative law values-maintaining agency constancy to congressional purpose-in order to extend protection to a new class of legisla77
tive beneficiaries.

Agencies' "fidelity to congressional intent" is the "central concern of
78
administrative law" because legislative directives typically represent the
conditions upon which agency policymaking is predicated. Where legislative
directives leave gaps for agencies to fill or speak in terms so broad as to
"give little hint of the congressional intent to which the agency must be
79
faithful," agencies look beyond Congress's specific intent to the broader
public interest. This expanded emphasis on agency fidelity reflects the fiduciary model's vision of administrative agencies as fiduciary institutions endowed
with authority from the sovereign people to perform services for their
statutory beneficiaries.
Because the initial "entrustors" and ultimate "beneficiaries" of agency
authority are frequently one and the same-the people as a whole-there is a
natural tendency to conflate these categories. But this is a mistake. While all
government authority might emanate in the first instance from the people,
many agencies service a discrete subset of the U.S. population (for example,
welfare recipients), aid persons outside U.S. territory (for example, recipients of
international humanitarian assistance), or protect private interests that cut
80
across national boundaries (as in, for example, international-trade regulation).
76.
Garland, supra note 5, at 512.
Id. (citation omitted).
77.
78.
/d.; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §50 cmt. c (2003) ("Even under the
broadest grant of fiduciary discretion, a trustee must act honestly and in a state of mind
contemplated by the settlor.").
79.
Garland, supra note 5, at 590.
See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
80.
Administrative Law 22 (Inst. for lnt'l Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 2004/1, 2004 ), available
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Agencies bear duties of fidelity not only to the terms of their statutory
entrustment but also to the best interests of their statutory beneficiaries,
however defined. Therefore, the tension in fiduciary law between a settlor's ex
ante expectations and beneficiaries' ex post preferences also reverberates
throughout administrative law. In both spheres, a central "theme is flexibility
and efficiency in the pursuit of the best interests of ... beneficiaries within
81
the settlor's legally permissible objectives." The fiduciary model thus clarifies
administrative law's approach to agency entrustment in the following respects.

1.

Agency Entrustment: Institutional and Individual

First, the fiduciary model offers a useful starting point for explaining why
the Constitution divides the incorporation power for administrative agencies
between the three branches rather than committing this power exclusively to
a single branch. As fiduciaries for the people as a whole, administrative agencies'
fiduciary obligations do not run solely to the chief executive or the legislature
per se, but rather to the agencies' statutory beneficiaries, who are often, but
not always, the sovereign people as a whole. To minimize the risk th at either
branch will unilaterally dominate public administration to beneficiaries'
detriment, the Constitution divides the tasks of agency entrustment. Congress
may entrust regulatory authority to administrative institutions, but only the
executive or judiciary has the power to populate these institutions by vesting
82
regulatory authority in individual administrators.
For its part, Congress designs administrative agencies and sets the terms
of agency entrustment. Agencies trace their authority to enabling legislation,
popularly referred to as its "enabling act" or "organic act." Like a corporation's
articles of incorporation, the enabling act outlines an agency's basic structure
and pinpoints the agency's coordinates within the firmament of federal

at http://www.iilj.org/papers/2004/documents/2004.1 KingsburyKrischStewart.pdf (observing that

"domestic regulatory bodies and officials" increasi ngly act as agents of global regularory regimes,
with duties to "orher states ... individuals and firms subject to regulation, [and] broader soc ial and
economic interests").
81.
Ha lbac h, supra note 46, at 1881.
82.
See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircwfr Noise, Inc.,
501 U.S. 252, 269 ( 1991) (holding that Q)ngress may not delegate regulatory power to an institution
in which "membership ... is restricted to congressional officials"). Not all agencies have been created
by Congress. SeeM. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383,
1387 n.4 (2004) (noting that the Environmental Protection Agency was estab lished first by
executive action) (citing Richard Nixon, Special Message from the Presidenr w the Congress About
Reorganization Plans w Eswblish the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (July 9, 1970), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE U NITED
STATES: RICHARD NIXON , 1970, at 578 ( 1971 ), available at http://www.hti .umich.edu/p/ppotpus).
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bureaucracy. For example, an enabling act may charge an agency with oversight
of a particular industry or public resource, fix the agency's basic modus
operandi, decide whether the agency will be led by a cabinet-level or subordinate
officer, assign the agency to a particular station within the executive branch's
organizational chart, and determine to what degree the agency's decisionmaking
processes will be insulated from presidential control. Perhaps most importantly,
Congress defines the overarching principles or objectives that should govern
the agency's exercise of discretion.
Although Congress sets the terms of entrustment for administrative
agencies, "in the business of appointments" the executive branch serves as the
83
people's "principal agent." The Appointments Clause of Article II empowers
the president to select all "Officers of the United States" with the "Advice and
84
Consent of the Senate." The Appointments Clause screens Congress from participating directly in agency appointments, as the Supreme Court stressed in
Buckley v. Valeo 85 and Bowsher v. Synar. 86 Congress may choose whether to
assign the appointment power for "inferior Officers" to "the President alone,"
to "the Courts of Law," or to "the Heads of Oepartments.',s 7 However, it "may
not direct that its laws be implemented through persons who are its agents in
88
the sense that it chose them."
The bifurcation of entrustment power between Congress and the president operates not only as "a bulwark against one branch aggrandizing its power
89
at the expense of another," but also as a safeguard against either branch
hijacking agency policymaking for personal gain. The Appointments Clause
thus reflects the fiduciary model's vision of administrative agencies as stewards
for the people as a whole rather than as mere institutional appendages of
Congress or the president.
2.

Legislative Subdelegation

A second area where the fiduciary model clarifies administrative law is the
so-called "nondelegation doctrine," which theoretically prohibits Congress

83.
THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
84.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
85.
424 u.s. 1 (1976).
86.
478 u.s. 714 (1986).
87.
U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2.
88.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 766 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (describing the
Coun's holding in Buckley).
89.
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (implying that the Appointments Clause was designed
"to provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others").
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from delegating "legislative power" to the executive and legislative branches.
The nondelegation doctrine traces its ancestry to a venerable maxim of
fiduciary law, delegata potestas non potest delegari (he who holds a delegated
power lacks the power to delegate it). In Locke's words:
The power of the Legislat[ure], being derived from the People by a
positive voluntary Grant ... can be no other than what that positive
grant conveyed, which being only to make Laws, and not to make
Legislators, the Legislat[ure] can have no power to transfer their
90
Authority of making Laws, and place it in other hands

While some have characterized the nondelegation doctrine as "essential
to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by
91

the Constitution," the doctrine's formalistic approach to "lawmaking power"
has proven to be unworkable in practice. Congress has neither the time nor the
specialized expertise to set every emissions standard, review every new
consumer drug, or assess the merits of every proposed modification to the
endangered species list. Even if Congress could perform these services, the
glacial pace of legislative action would prevent it from responding effectively
in an era of rapid economic, technological, and social change. As the Supreme
91
Court acknowledged in Mistretta v . United States, "Congress simply cannot do
91
its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."
Bowing to these practical constraints, the Court has allowed Congress to
subdelegate the details of federal regulation to agencies provided that
94
Congress provides an "intelligible principle" to guide agency discretion.
The Court's anemic enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine has
prompted some scholars to characterize the doctrine as a failed experiment, a
91
historical aberration that has fallen into desuetude. Over sixty years have
passed since the Court last struck down federal legislation on nondelegation

90.
LOCKE, supra note IS, bk. II , § 141 ; see also Shankland v. Mayor of Washingto n, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 390, 395 ( 1831) ("[T]he general rule of law is, that a delegated authority cannot be delegated.").
91.
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,697 (1892) (Lamar, J. , dissenting).
92.
488
361 (1989).
Jd. at 372; see also J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406
93.
(1928) (explaining that the nondelegation doctrine's application should be consistent with
"common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination").
94.
Mistreun, 488 U.S. at 372-73.
This question has been debated most recently by Eric Posner, Adrian Vermeule, Larry
95.
Alexander, and Saikrishna Prakash. Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegarion Docr:rine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002) !hereinafter Posner & Vermeul e, Interring]
(arguing that a statutory grant of authority ro the executive branch does not effect a delegation of legislative
power), and Eric A. Posner & Adrian Venneule, Norulelegacion: A Post-murtem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331
(2003) (same ), with Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Re{Xms of the Nondelegation Docr:rine's Death
Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003) (challenging the Posner-Vermeule thesis).

u.s.
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96

grounds. In the meantime, it has approved numerous delegations with vacuous "intelligible principle[s]" such as the instructions to set "fair and equitable"
prices or to award broadcast licenses in "the public interest.'m While the Court
98
has not formally abandoned the nondelegation doctrine, the emergence of the
intelligible-principle rule has left the doctrine with a menacing bark, but no
real bite.
This defanged nondelegation doctrine might seem, at first glance, to
bear little resemblance to the delegata potestas maxim passed down from
fiduciary law. But delegata potestas was never the monolithic rule that Locke
envisioned. As Justice Story recognized in a private-law case, "the true doctrine" was far more nuanced and contextual: Delegated authority is "exclusively personal, unless from the express language used, or from the fair
presumptions, growing out of the particular transaction, or of the usage of
99
trade, a broader power was intended to be conferred on the agent.'' The
presumption against fiduciary subdelegation could be rebutted by evidence
of industry custom or of a different expectation between the parties. Over
time, these exceptions have eclipsed the nondelegation presumption.
Trustees today commonly enlist professional financial consultants for
100
assistance with asset management. Stockholders expect corporate directors to
subdelegate administrative duties within corporations to expert managers. As
economic and social change have eroded the assumptions upon which the
nondelegation canon once rested, courts have permitted greater fiduciary
subdelegation to further beneficiaries' interests and honor entrustors'
101
Thus, private law and administrative law have both
presumed intent.
96.
See ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating
a delegation under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) to establish codes of fair
competition); Pan. Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (invalidating a delegation to
the president under NIRA to prohibit interstate shipment of certain oil).
97.
Harold]. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 710, 724-25 & nn.57-59
(1994) (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)).
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
98.
99.
Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 95, at 1733 (quoting jOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY§ 14, at 14-16 (Boston, Charles P. Greenough ed., Little,
Brown & Co., 9th ed. 1882) (1839)).
100.
Indeed, some have suggested that current law might require amateur trustees to
subdelegate investment authority to professionals. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory
of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 640 n.91 (2004) (citing inter alia RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 171 & cmt. f (1992); John H. Langbein, The Uniform
Prudent Inveswr Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641,665--66 (1996)).
101.
See 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 19, § 171, at 438 ("[The duty not to delegate)
does not mean, of course, that the trustee must personally perform every act that may be necessary
or proper in the execution of the trust. He can properly permit others to perform acts he cannot
reasonably be required personally to perform."). Congress also has given the president substantial
discretion to subdelegate authoriry to "the head of any department or agency in the executive

HeinOnline -- 54 UCLA L. Rev. 142 2006-2007

Fiduciary Foundations

143

drifted toward a more flexible nondelegation doctrine, one that reflects
popular expectations about the propriety of fiduciary subdelegation.
The "prudent-investor" rule in private law and the "intelligible-principle"
rule in administrative law each operate as weak constraints on fiduciary
subdelegation, permitting all but the most flagrant and exhaustive abdications of responsibility. For example, trustees bear a "duty not to delegate the
102
doing of acts [that they] can reasonably be required personally to perform,"
but they also "ha[ve] power, and may sometimes have a duty, to delegate such
functions and in such manner as a prudent investor would delegate under the
.
ni Ol U n d er t h e pru d ent-mvestor
.
£
circumstances.
ru le, courts d erer
to a trustees'
detennination regarding the propriety of a subdelegation except under extreme
circumstances, such as where the subdelegation effectively "transfer[s] to
104
another the whole responsibility for the administration of the trust." The
co-evolution of these rules over the past century parallels shifting public
expectations and reflects the conceptual linkages between private fiduciary
law and administrative law.
3.

Delegation and Deference

The standards for judicial deference to administrative agencies also
closely parallel principles of private fiduciary entrustment. Federal courts
have "long given considerable and in some cases decisive weight" to agency
101
actions and routinely defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
This tradition of judicial deference to agency discretion builds upon a theory
of agency entrustment that has its roots in the fiduciary concept.

branch, or any official thereof who is required to be appo inted by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate." 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); see also 5 U.S.C. § 903(a)(5) (2000) (empowering the
president to authorize subordinates to delegate authority); 28 U.S.C. § 510 (2000) (authorizing
the attorney general to subde legate authority).
102.
2ASCOTT& FRATCHER , supranote 19,§ 171.2, at 442.
I 03.
Halbach, supra note 46, at 1910 (explaining that a tntstee need only "act with prudence in
deciding whether and how to delegate authority and in the selection and supervision of agents")
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE§ 227(c)(2) ( 1992)).
2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 19, § 171.1, at 439. The prudent-investor rule
104.
may also help to ex plain why the Court has permitted Congress to delegate certain regulatory
activities to privflte parties. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 987 (1983) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("While most authority to issue rules and regulations is given to the Executive Branch and
the independent regul atory agencies, statutory delegRtions to private persons have Rlso passed this
Court's scrutiny."); United States v. Rock Royal Coop. Inc. , 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 ( 1939)
(upholding an f\Ct that gave private partie-; a veto rx)wer over agency m<~rketing orders); Currin v.
Wallace, 306 U.S. l ( 1939) (upholding an act a ll owi ng farmers affected by agency action to vote
on prospective regulations).
105.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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The natural starting point for exploring judicial deference to agency
decisionmaking is Justice Stevens's classic two-step analysis in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 106 First, federal courts do
not defer to agency decisions that contravene the "unambiguously expressed
107
. t h e statutory
.
mtent
o f Congress. "
econd , wh ere Congress leaves "a gap" m
scheme "for the agency to fill," courts construe the gap as "an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation" and will defer to the agency's reasonable constructions
108
of the statute. To these two steps, recent Court decisions add a third piece to
the puzzle, popularly known as Skidmore deference: Where administrative
agencies seek to regulate an area beyond the scope of their statutorily
delegated authority, their interpretation of a statute is not conclusive, but
may be accorded considerable weight "depend[ing] upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
109
persuade, if lacking power to control."
Thus, administrative law currently
posits at least three scenarios where judicial deference to agency administration
may be appropriate: ( 1) the agency implements an unambiguous statutory
instruction; (2) the agency exercises delegated rulemaking authority to resolve
an ambiguity or fill a gap in a statutory regime; or (3) the agency's interpretation
of the statute is otherwise persuasive.
Although the expertise, interest-representation, and presidential-control
110
models offer supporting policy rationales for Chevron deference, the Court

s

467 u.s. 837 (1984).
/d. at 843 (citations omitted).
/d. at 843-44. This is true even if a court has previously spoken to the question resolved
by the agency. See Nat'! Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688,
2700 (2005) ("Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the
106.
107.
108.

agency's interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting
agency construction."). Courts are similarly deferential to an agency's interpretation of its own
rules. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (holding that courts
should give an agency interpretation of its own regulation "controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation").
109.
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
110.
See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)
(observing that generalist federal judges lack administrators' special expertise and "greater
familiarity with the ever-changing facts and circumstances surrounding the subjects regulated") (citing
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991)), abrogated by Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (suggesting that agency policymaking
enhances democratic accountability by placing regulatory policy more firmly within an
"incumbent administration's" sphere of influence); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The
Executive's Power w Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (arguing that Chevron
deference reflects the executive branch's superior expertise and accountability); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Democratizing the Administrative State 3 (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research
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has stressed on numerous occasions that Chevron rest5 principally upon a theory
of legislative entrustment: Federal courts presume that Congress delegates
lawmaking power to administrative agencies to clarify ambiguities and fill gaps
111
in the statutes they administer. Justice Scalia explained in Smiley v. Citibank :
[Courts] accord deference to agencies under Chevron, not
because . .. they drafted the provisions in question, or were present at
the hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; but rather because of a
presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant
for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity
would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the
agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discre. t h e am b'1gu1ty
. a ll ows. li Z
tton

If statutory ambiguity represents Congress's implicit delegation of
lawmaking authority, statutory clarity demarcates the outer limits of an
agency's Chewon authority. An agency's statutory interpretation commands
Chevron deference only if Congress has charged the agency with adminis111
trative responsibility for the relevant statute; when another agency administers the relevant statute, the proffered interpretations are "not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority," though they could still qualify
114
as persuasive authority under the weaker Skidmore standard.
Similarly,
Chewon does not permit agencies to construe statutory provisions in a
11
manner that would raise significant constitutional concems s or expand the
116
agency's discretionary authority outside the fields contemplated by Congress.
Chevron's logic of legislative entrustment thus preserves agency discretion within

173, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/~bmac t=839227 (arguing that the Chevron Court
Chevron deference in the relationship between agencies and the President").
See 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
ld. at 740-41; cf. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference': Implied Delegations,
Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN . L. REV. 735, 746-47 (2002)
("[l]n Mead the Supreme Court squarely located the requirement of Chevron defere nce on a theory
of nn implied delegation of lawmaking power. Under Mead federal courts should afford Chevron
Paper No.
"anchored
111.
112.

deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory texts only when the agency enjoys
congressionally-delegated power to make quasi-statutory interpretations.").
113.
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 ( 1990), superseded by statute, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1854(d)(l) (2000).
114.
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
115.
See Solid Waste Agency ofN. Cook County v. U.S. Anny Corps. ofEng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
116.
See Go nzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904,916-17 (2006); FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (noting that courts may require stronger ev idence of
legislative entrustment when agencies assert authority to make decisions of great "economic and
political magnitude"). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 329
(2000) ("jU]nder Chevron, agencies are not merely given authority that is often open-ended; they are
also permitted to interpret the scope of their own authority, at least in the fac e of ambiguity.").
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the scope of legislative delegations (express, implied, or imputed) without
licensing agencies to expand their delegated authority beyond its intended scope.
The Court has vacillated over the appropriate methodology for discerning agency entrustment. In most cases, the Court has construed Chevron as a
presumption "that ambiguities in statutes within an agency's jurisdiction to
administer are delegations of [lawmaking] authority to the agency to fill the
118
117
In United States v. Mead Corp.,
statutory gap in [a] reasonable fashion."
however, eight justices cast doubt upon this strong presumption by denying
Chevron deference to a U.S. Customs Services' tariff classification. According
to Mead, tariff classifications do not warrant Chevron deference because "the
terms of the congressional delegation give no indication that Congress meant
to delegate authority to Customs to issue classification rulings with the force
119
oflaw." On its face, Mead's rationale encourages courts to pierce Chevron's presumption of ambiguity-qua-delegation in search of particularized evidence "that
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law
120
when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law."
At present, it is unclear how the Court will resolve this tension between
Chevron's blanket presumption of legislative delegation and Mead's contingent, contextual approach. Yet, however this question is resolved, the mere
fact that all nine justices appear to accept legislative delegation as the touchstone for Chevron deference is itself remarkable. The Court defers to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes to honor agencies' entrusted lawmaking
117.
Nat'! Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet SeiVs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699 (2005);
see also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469,
490-91 ( 1996) (observing that courts prefer to infer entrustment based on the formation of a
relationship of trust rather than look for discrete acts of delegation, thereby bypassing the
"fictional" aspect of legislative intent); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference ro Administrative Interpretations
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (same) .
118.
533 u.s. 218 (2001).
119.
I d. at 231-32. The Court proceeded to argue that "express congressional authorizations
to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication" would be "a very good indicator of
delegation meriting Chevron treatment." Id. at 229. But see id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("What was previously a general presumption of authority in agencies to resolve ambiguity in the
statutes they have been authorized to enforce has been changed to a presumption of no such authority,
which must be overcome by affirmative legislative intent to the contrary.") .
I 20.
Id. at 229. Despite its rationale, Mead is probably better understood in reference to
Congress's expectations for how agencies will exercise delegated lawmaking powers rather than
whether Congress has delegated lawmaking powers in the first place. When agencies interpret statutes
informally without invoking their entrusted lawmaking authority, these interpretations are not
necessarily binding on courts. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)
("[Agency) interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law ... do not warrant Chevron-style deference." ); Martin
v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (stating that interpretive
rules are "not entitled w the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of [an agency]'s
delegated lawmaking powers").

HeinOnline -- 54 UCLA L. Rev. 146 2006-2007

Fiduciary Foundations

147

authority, not merely to vindicate the executive branch's constitutional powers,
expertise, or electoral accountability (although these factors clearly
strengthen the case for deference). ln fairness, it must be conceded that this
notion of legislative delegation is usually a thinly veiled fiction-though it is
no greater fiction than private fiduciary law's attribution of entrusted authority to parents, guardians, and other noncontractual fiduciaries. Courts treat
agencies as possessing authority to resolve ambiguities and fill gaps wherever
agencies have administrative responsibility for a statutory scheme; whether
111
Congress actually intended to delegate lawmaking authority "matters not."
Chevron and its progeny thus rest firmly on a fiduciary theory of administrative entrustment.
B.

Agency Accountability

Implicit in the Chevron doctrine and other principles of agency entrustment is the expectation that agencies will exercise their authority in a manner
that honors the delegation's purpose and serves the agency's beneficiaries. As
in private fiduciary relations, trust lies at the heart of the public's social contract with the administrative state. The rapid growth of federal bureaucracy
during the New Deal can be traced to the public's shaken faith in unregulated
markets and enhanced confidence in the federal government during the 1930s
111
While recent decades have been marked by greater cynicism
and 1940s.
regarding the trustworthiness of federal regulators and the desirability of federal
regulation, public trust remains the keystone of administrative governance.
The federal government's regulatory role in areas ranging from education to
natural resources to homeland security is made possible by the public's general
acceptance of administrative agencies as fiduciary institutions capable of
following legislative directives in good faith, suppressing self-interest, and
resisting the distorting pressures of pork-barrel politics. The expansion of the
modem administrative state over the twentieth century can be viewed,
therefore, as a burgeoning fiduciary compact between federal agencies and the
American people.
At the same time, however, the delicate framework of regulatory governance can easily decay into corruption, cronyism, factionalism, capriciousness, and waste. As stewards over vast public resources and powerful regulatory
regimes, administrative agencies face extraordinary pressures from both within
and outside government-not all of which are conducive to conscientious
121.
122.

Chevron U.S.A. , Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,865 (1984).
See Garland, supra note 5, at 577 .
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administration, to put it mildly. For decades, political scientists have decried
the so-called "iron triangles" between private industry, agency administrators,
and congressional committees, which institutionalize factionalism, entrench123
ing narrow interests in opposition to broad-based progressive reforms. Public
resources pooled under agency control may also become breeding grounds for
rent-seeking bureaucrats and unscrupulous lobbyists. Bureaucratic mismanagement can be equally insidious, leading to arbitrary, uninformed, and wasteful
policies. In many instances, asymmetries in expertise and information can
frustrate efforts by the president, Congress, and nongovernmental watchdogs
to monitor agency performance. While agency entrustment is predicated upon
public trust, the threat of agency mismanagement presents an equally
compelling case for distrust.
Distrust of representative government was perhaps the dominant preoccupation of the founding generation, as evidenced during the Constitutional
124
())nvention debates, and this legacy lingers as a recurring motif in contemporary administrative law. Administrative law addresses the threats posed by
agency discretion through the same mechanisms as private fiduciary law:
residual control and fiduciary duties. ())urrs enforce these bonding mechanisms
to complement preexisting social norms and to maximize the efficiencies of
agency specialization.
1.

Executive and Legislative Control

When regulatory authority vests in an administrative agency, the political branches each retain a measure of residual control over the agency's
performance. For instance, ())ogress may enact new legislation to modify an
agency's substantive mandate or modus operandi. The president likewise has a
125
duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," and he may demand
that agency heads make a fiduciary accounting of their activities at any time
by rendering an opinion in writing "upon any Subject relating to the Duties
126
of their ... Offices."
The president also exerts indirect control over agency
policy through executive orders requiring interagency coordination and

123.
See CHARLES H. KOCH, ]R., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & POLICY§ 7.12 (2d ed. 1997);
THEODORE j. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 22
(2d ed. 1979); jEFFREY WORSHAM, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: POLICY CHANGE, CONGRESS, AND
BANK REGULATION 1 (1997).
124.
See MarciA. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L.
REv. 807, 810 (1999) (describing the Constitutional Convention as a veritable "feast of disr:rust") .
125 .
U .S. CONST. art . II,§ 3.
126.
I d. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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preregulation agenda setting,m and he may remove administrators
under appropriate circumstances.
What is particularly striking about the political branches' control over
the administrative process, however, is the extent to which this control is
cabined by separation of powers principles and other legal and practical constraints. For example, although Congress sets the terms of agency entrustment, Congress possesses no power to influence agency decisionmaking
outside the bicameral requirements of Article I. Congress cannot reserve to
115
itself the prerogative to revoke agency regulations by "legislative veto" or to
129
Nor can it
remove administrators who deviate from statutory instructions.
appoint its own members or agents as ex officio members of agency commissions110 or authorize the president to "cancel" discrete provisions of statutes
111
that have been signed into law. Indeed, even Congress's indisputable authority to curtail agency discretion through legislation has limited practical effect
due to the extraordinary amount of time, coordination, and political capital
needed for bicameral lawmaking.
Legal and practical constraints also restrict the president's influence over
agency administration. The president, like entrustors in private fiduciary relations, often influences agency behavior through infonnal means-for instance,
by making recommendations to the administrators he has appointed. Certain
executive orders also provide for agencies to furnish cost-benefit analyses of
proposed regulations and alternatives to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), facilitating the president's review of agency regulations. m
127.
See 1 RICHARD j . PIERCE, jR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE* 7 .9, at 498-99 (4th
ed. 2002) (describing Executive Orders 12 ,291 a nd 12.498) ; Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administmtion, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (discussing efforts by the White House to make
administrative agencies more responsive to the preside nt's political and policy age ndas); Richard
B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 443 (2003)
(terming these processes of executiv e review "analytic management").
128.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S . 9 19, 954-55 ( 1983 ); see also id. at 955 ("Congress must abide
by its delegation of authority until that delegat ion is leg islatively altered or revoked.") .
129.
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986) ("Once the appointment has been
made and confirmed, ... the Constitution ex plicitly provides for removal of Officers of the
United States by Congress only upon impeachment by the House of Representatives and
conviction by the Senate ... on 'Treason, Bribery[,] o r other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."')
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4); see also id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Wihen
Congress ... seeks to make policy that will bind the Nation, it must foll o w the procedures
mandated by Article I of the Constitution-through passage by both Houses and presentment to
the President.").
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976).
130.
131.
See Clinton v. City of New York. 524 U.S. 417, 436-37 (I 998).
132.
See Stewart, supra note 127, at 443 (describing the rationale behind Executive Order
12 ,291 ); Richard H. Fildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. 0-11. L. REV. I, 3
(1995) (same).
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But the president lacks formal authority to prescribe regulatory policy in
instances where statutes expressly assign decisionmaking to another executive
officer, and he is ordinarily powerless to alter or abrogate the statutory
133
standards for agency discretion. To the extent that agencies set policy through
adjudicatory processes, due process prevents the president from intervening to
override decisions by administrative law judges. While it is certainly true that
the president may remove some errant officers based on policy disagreements,
Congress has limited this removal authority for most executive
134
appointments, and the president lacks formal legal authority to compel these
officers to follow a prescribed course of conduct. Even where the president
possesses removal power, the political ramifications of removal and the
information asymmetries between the president and agencies may frustrate
135
executive control.
If one accepts the premise that the administrative state's legitimacy
hinges upon executive or legislative control of agency policy (as posited in
the transmission-belt and unitary-executive models), the gaping holes in
the political branches' power to control regulatory decisionmaking strike at
136
the heart of agency legitimacy. The fiduciary model, in contrast, views these
constraints as essential to effective agency administration. When Congress
entrusts critical rights or resources to an administrative agency, it usually does
so to harness the expertise and efficiencies of institutional specialization. Just
as corporate boards may inadvertently stymie productivity by attempting to
micromanage corporate administration, so too may Congress and the president stymie regulatory policymaking by maintaining too tight a grip on the

133 .
See 1 PIERCE, supra note 127, § 7.9, at 501.
See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that Congress may provide
134.
for removal of the independent counsel by the attorney general rather than the president);
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (stressing that Congress's authority
to limit the president's removal power for certain agencies "cannot well be doubted"); Shapiro,
supra note 11, at 6 (noting that Congress "can limit the President's authority to remove
administrators because of policy disagreements" and that "it has done so in the 'independent
agencies"'); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 409 (1958) ("A principal is privileged to
discharge before the time fixed by the contract of employment an agent who has committed such
a violation of duty that his conduct constitutes a material breach of contract .. . .");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 37 (2003) (noting that discharge of a trustee is appropriate
"(a) in accordance with the terms of the trust; or (b) for cause by a proper court").
135.
As Richard J. Pierce, Jr. has argued, "The greatest constraints on presidential power to
control agency policymaking are purely practical. It is simply impossible for the President even to be
aware of all of the policy decisions agencies make." 1 PIERCE, supra note 127, § 7.9, at 502-03 .
136.
See , e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105,
115-16 (1988) (arguing that administrative agencies' relative autonomy deprives the president of
"the independent will that the Founders had in mind when they called for an executive with
greater energy").
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reins of agency rulemaking. Indeed, in contexts where agencies adjudicate
individual claims or mediate between conflicting factions, one might argue
that the political branches-like trust settlors-should retain only the limited
residual control necessary to prevent flagrant malfeasance. Agency discretion
has its dangers, to be sure, but excessive intermeddling in the regulatory process systematically dilutes agency expertise and plunges agency discretion more
deeply into the mire of partisan politics.
Whether contemporary administrative law strikes an optimal balance
between residual control and agency discretion is highly debatable, to be sure.
There might be good reasons, constitutional or otherwise, for strengthening
or weakening the political branches' control over certain aspects of the
administrative process. The more significant point for present purposes, however, is that the public interest may be best served by a legal regime where neither
the president nor Congress exercises unqualified control over agency action.
2.

Fiduciary Duties

The wisdom of constraining executive and legislative residual control
over the administrative process becomes more apparent when one takes into
account the other accountability mechanisms embedded in administrative
law. As in private fiduciary law, administrative agencies owe fiduciary duties
to their statutory beneficiaries, the ultimate stakeholders in agency action,
and courts enforce these duties by requiring agencies to discharge them with
absolute loyalty and reasonable care.m The parallels between private fiduciary duties and agency duties are striking. Agencies are bound to exercise reasonable prudence when exercising delegated powers, and they are forbidden
from entering self-interested transactions or arbitrarily discriminating
between similarly situated beneficiaries. Courts enforce these fiduciary duties
as minimal standards of rationality, consistency, transparency, public deliberation, and thoroughness in investigating alternatives. Rather than extract
agency duties of loyalty and care from the primordial soup of federal common

137.
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 428 ("Unless otherwise agreed, a subagent
who knows of the existence of the ultimate principal owes him the duties owed by an agent to a
principal, except the duties dependent upon the existence of a contract.") . Some have suggested that
fiduciaries also owe duties of loyalty and care to persons other than their beneficiaries. See Stewart
E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2761--62
(2006) (noting the tension between fidelity to the settlor and fidelity to beneficiaries); Joseph T.
Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 333 (2002) (arguing that under
current law, corporate directors may owe fiduciary duties to community interests in addition to
shareholders).
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law, however, courts have drawn these fidelity norms from the Constitution,
138
the APA, and other transsubstantive procedural statutes.
Courts do not necessarily characterize agencies' constitutional and statutory obligations as fiduciary duties, of course. In practice, however, judicial
"hard look" review of agency rulemaking, "substantial-evidence" review of
agency adjudication, and other standards of judicial review closely track
courts' standards for private fiduciary duties. The purpose is not to substitute
judicial discretion for agency discretion, but rather merely to ensure that
agencies exercise their discretion through a process that ensures reasonable
care, loyalty, and transparency. Administrative law calls upon courts to enforce
agency duties in order to promote fidelity to agencies' statutorily defined
missions and the best interests of their beneficiaries.
a.

Informal Rulemaking

The fiduciary duties of care and loyalty play an important, if underappreciated, role in structuring the procedural requirements for informal rulemaking. The AP A authorizes agencies to issue legislative rules through a three-step
process consisting of (1) public notice of the proposed rule; (2) solicitation of
public comments; and (3) issuance of a final rule containing "a concise general
139
statement of [the rule's] basis and purpose." Proposed rules must be published
in the Federal Register at least thirty days before their effective date with a
description of the legal and factual basis for the agency's decision to give the
140
public an adequate opportunity to respond to the proposed rule. Over time,
courts have stretched the "concise general statement" language to require
increasingly detailed statements of the rule's purposes, factual predicates, and
anticipated effects, as well as responses to major criticisms and alternatives
elicited during the notice-and-comment process.
Traditionally, the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements
have been understood as tools for democratizing administrative rulemaking,
but this vision is largely chimerical. Notice-and-comment procedures may
138.
See Peter H. Schuck, The Administrative Procedure Act, in FoUNDATIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 53 ("The APA has been called a quasi-constitutional
statute, with good reason. If there were no APA, the courts ... would certainly have invented
something like it in order to implement the constitutional safeguards of the Fifth Amendment's
due process clause.").
139.
5 U .S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
140.
Jd. § 553(b), (d); see also Kooritzky v. Reich, 17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that
failure to comply with APA procedural requirements is a ground for remanding a regulation to the
agency); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.Zd 375 , 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that
an agency's notice was insufficient because the rules were based on "inadequate data, or on data that
[was] known only to the agency"); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.Zd 1013 (3d Cir. 1972) (same).
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compel agencies to engage interest-group preferences, but interest groups
have no formal voting rights or veto power in agency rulemaking. Once the
window for public notice and comment has closed, an agency is free to proceed
with its proposed course of action despite persistent public objection so long as its
grounds for rejecting the objections meets minimal standards of rationality.
Indeed, a strong argument can be made that the notice-and-comment process
decreases interest-group influence by channeling factional pressures into public
111
Satisfying these
fora where they are subject to heightened public scrutiny.
minimal procedural requirements might force agencies to consider a broad
spectrum of perspectives and public values, but the APA does not ensure that
regulations reflect interest groups' aggregate preferences.
A more persuasive explanation for notice-and-comment rulemaking
comes from the fiduciary model: The APA employs notice-and-comment
procedures as minimalist procedural safeguards akin to the fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty in private law. As the Supreme Court explained, the APA's
notice-and-comment procedures are best understood as "the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose
142
upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures." Courts may only "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions" that are
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
14 3
To satisfy judicial review under these standards, agencies must
with law."
show they exercised due care by furnishing a full, contemporaneous administrative record, explaining in detail the rationale for their decisions, and
144
validating departures from past decisions. Agencies' explanations must address
141.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63
( 1985) (arguing that "judicial efforts to require disclosure of ex parte contacts ... reflect[] a belief
that the pluralist understanding of administration threatens to subvert statutory goals by reflecting
private whim") (citations omitted).
142.
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Oxp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978);
see also FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965) ("To permit federal district courts to establish
administrative procedures de now would, of course, render nugatory Congress' effort to insure that
administrative procedures be designed by those most familiar with the regulatory problems involved.").
143.
5
c.§ 706(2).
See INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996) (holding that an agency's act of
144.
announcing and then changing "an irrational departure from that policy ... could constitute action that
must be overtu rned as 'arbitrary , capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion' within the meaning of the
[APAJ"); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971) (remanding to
consider whether an alternative approach would be "feasible and prudent" (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964
& Supp. V); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1964 & Supp. V)); Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 414,416 (D.C.
Ci r. 1977) ("This court emphatically requires that administrative agencies adhere to their own
precedents or explain any deviations from them."); cf. I SCOTT & FRA TCHER, supra note 19, § 2.5,
at 43 ("If the fiduciary enters into a transaction with the beneficiary and fails to make a full disclosure
of all ci rcumstances known to him affec ting the transaction, or if the transaction is unfair to the
beneficiary, it can be set aside by him. These are characteristics of all fiduciary relatio ns ... .").

u.s.
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all salient aspects of a problem, including the relative costs and benefits of
reasonable alternatives, and persuade courts that the final rule is not inconsis145
tent with the empirical evidence before the agency.
Under limited circumstances, courts may also set aside agency decisions that are not supported by
"substanna
. l ev1'dence" or are " unwarranted by the facts. " 146 The APA thus provides that administrative agencies, like private fiduciaries, bear the initial
burden to produce a record demonstrating that their decision was "the product of reasoned decisionmaking." 147
b.

Adjudication

When administrative agencies act through adjudication rather than
informal rulemaking, courts also enforce the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care
through constitutional due process and the APA's procedural requirements. As
in fiduciary law, courts have been known to wax eloquent on the importance of
affording agency petitioners a rigorously thorough and impartial hearing. In
practice, however, courts are usually highly deferential to agency adjudicatory
proceedings, overturning agency decisions only where the procedures applied
do not meet minimum procedural requirements or the agency's factual findings
are either not supported by "substantial evidence" for formal adjudication or
148
"arbitrary" and "capricious" for informal adjudication. Although courts may
emphasize agencies' nonderogable duties of reasonable care and impartiality, they
give agency adjudicators broad discretion to fashion procedures and remedies
appropriate to their particular context. Judicial deference to agency adjudicators
thus reflects an understanding that "Congress places a premium on agency expertise, and [that], for the sake of uniformity, it is better to minimize the opportunity
149
for reviewing courts to substitute their discretion for that of the agency."
145.
See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) ;
Pierce, supra note 11, at 1263 (explaining the significance of State Fann); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995) ("To have any
realistic chance of upholding a major rule on judicial review, an agency's statement of basis and
purpose now must discuss in detail each of scores of policy disputes, data disputes, and alternatives
to the rule adopted by the agency."); Sunstein, supra note 144, at 61 (describing the "hard look"
doctrine's requirements) .
146.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E), (F).
147.
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 52; cf. DeMott, supra note 63, at 900 (observing that a fiduci ary
bears the burden to establish that he or she has "dealt candidly and fairly with" beneficiaries) . But
cf. Scott & Scott, supra note 23, at 2423-24 (observing that the business-judgment rule in corporate
law creates "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company") (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.Zd 805,812 (Del. 1984)).
148.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E).
149.
Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607,621 (1966) .
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In administrative hearings, due process requires that administrative tribunals exercise reasonable prudence in affording procedural safeguards during a
hearing. These safeguards may include notice of the proposed action and the
grounds asserted, an opportunity to present reasons why the agency should not
take a _proposed action, the right to present evidence and receive notice of
opposing evidence, and the right to written findings of fact and a rational
150
What reasonable prudence demands
explanation for the agency's decision.
will vary, however, depending upon the exigencies of each case. As Justice
Powell reasoned for the majority in Mathews v. Eldridge,"' "'[D]ue process,' unlike
some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
111
time, place and circumstances." Agencies' hearings therefore "need not take
the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial" so long as they entail "minimal
procedural safeguards, adapted to the particular [circumstances] ... and to the
113
limited nature of the controversies to be resolved." While agencies are often
encouraged to offer more generous procedural protections, agencies can survive
judicial review by satisfying the Due Process Clause's minimal requirements.
The APA provides for courts to defer to formal agency findings that are
supported by "substantial evidence." In practice, this substantial-evidence
standard is remarkably similar to the hard-look standard of review for agency
rulemaking. Courts "consider the whole record" and evaluate the agency's
rationale in light of "whatever in the record detracts from its weight." ~ Courts
also greet agency findings of fact or conclusions of law with greater skepticism if
they contradict the agency's previous findings or holdings. When such
inconsistencies arise, the onus falls on agency adjudicators to come up with a
111
An agency's
rational explanation for the agency's departure from precedent.
failure to consider salient facts also may be viewed as grounds for vacating the
agency's judgment. These principles have little to do with the "substantiality" of
the evidence before the agency, but they have everything to do with whether
the agency exercised reasonable prudence in reaching its final determination.
11

150.
See 2 PIERCE, su{Jra note 127, !i 9.5, at 617 (citing Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L REV. 1267 (1975)); see also 5 U.S.C. !i 557(c)(3)(A) (requiring 8 statement
of "findings and conclusions, 8nd the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact,
law, or discretion presented on the record" for formal adjudications); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990) (holding that a reviewing court can demand that an
agency provide an explanation for an action take n during informal adjudication).
151.
424
319 (1976).
/d. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ).
152.
153.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266--67 ( 1970).
154.
Universal Ca mera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 4 74, 488 (1951 ).
155.
See 2 PIERCE, su{Jra note 127, !i 11.2, at 785--88 (citing inrer alia Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,853 (D.C. Cir. 1970); ITT Cont'l Banking Co. v. FTC. 532
F2d207 ,2 l9(2dCir 1976)).

u.s.
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In at least one context, however, even "substantial evidence" will not
protect an agency's formal adjudication from judicial censure: where the record
suggests that the agency adjudicator had a unique personal stake in the
decision. Federal law prohibits officers and employees of the executive
branch from participating in a determination in which he or a relative has a
156
Where agency adjudicators are
direct and substantial financial interest.
found to have a particularized pecuniary interest in an adjudicatory proceeding or to have a unique personal bias against a petitioner, federal courts may
157
Like the
override the agency determination as fruit of the poisonous tree.
duty of loyalty in private fiduciary law, these prohibitions against selfinterested adjudication have a prophylactic effect, resulting in the vacatur
and remand of agency determinations that have the appearance of opportunism
or bias--even if the petitioner cannot demonstrate actual harm.
Similarly, due process prohibits courts from granting deference to an
administrative agency's judgment if there is a possibility that idiosyncratic
158
institutional interests could compromise the agency's impartiality. An exem159
plary case is Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, where the Supreme Court
held that a U.S. Attorney lacked authority to certify to a court that an
employee "was acting within the scope of his office or employment" for torts
160
arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The problem with the
FTCA's certification procedure, the Court explained, was that in cases where
the alleged tort took place on foreign soil, the U.S. Attorney's certification
would effectively immunize the defendant officer from civil liability under the
161
FTCA.
The "impetus to certify becomes overwhelming in a case like this
one," the Court observed, because "the United States Attorney will feel a
strong tug to certify, even when the merits are cloudy, and thereby 'do a
favor,' ... both for the employee and for the United States as well, at a cost

156.
See 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2000) (forbidding executive officials from participating in
actions in which they or persons or entities closely associated with them have "a financial
interest"); Exec. Order No. 11,222, 30 Fed. Reg. 6469, 6470 (May 8, 1965) ("Employees may
not ... have direct or indirect financial interests that conflict substantially ... with their
responsibilities and duties as Federal employees .... ").
See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (per curiam) (invalidating a search
157.
warrant because the justice of the peace received a fee for each warrant issued); Hall v. Marion
Sch. Dist. No.2, 31 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 1994) (constitutional rights violated where a school board
was biased against a teacher for critical remarks aimed at board members).
158.
See generally Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest,
13 CORNELLJ.L. & PuB. POL'Y 203 (2004).
159.
515 u.s. 417 (1995).
Id. at 421-22 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)).
160.
161.
Id. at 422.
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162
borne solely, and perhaps quite unfairly, by the plaintiff."
Hence,
"[r]ecognizing that a U.S. Attorney, in cases of this order, is hardly positioned
to act impartially," the Court held that the U.S. Attorney's certification order
was subject to judicial review and remanded for the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals to conduct a full, de novo review of the underlying merits.
The duty of loyalty also may manifest itself in administrative law not as
a prohibition against self-dealing but rather as a nondiscrimination norm:
Absent statutory authorization, agencies may not exercise their discretion in
a manner that arbitrarily advances or undermines the interests of one faction
vis-a-vis another. For agency adjudication, no less than for agency rulemak161
ing, "outside review is still necessary to keep organizational insiders honest."
c.

Choice of Policymaking Procedures

Although rarely acknowledged in contemporary case law, the fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty also apply to administrative agencies' choice of
policymaking procedures. In addition to infonnal rulemaking and adjudication, agencies may employ a variety of other procedures to deal with novel
regulatory problems. Examples include regulatory negotiation, licensing, and
judicial-enforcement actions. The fiduciary duties of care and loyalty apply
not only to agencies' use of these regulatory tools but also to their choice
164
between these tools.
The principle that administrative agencies have broad discretion to
select their own modus operandi traces its origins to the Supreme Court's
1947 decision, SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery Il). 165 In Chenery II, the Court
held that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) could announce
new policies in the course of an adjudicatory proceeding "regardless of whether
those standards previously had been spelled out in a general rule or regulation."166 Although the Court stressed that it would be preferable for the SEC to
fill holes in the Holding Company Act through "quasi-legislative promulgation
of rules" rather than adjudication, it declined to require rulemaking procedures
162.
/d. at 427-28.
Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276,
163.
1335 (1984 ).
164.
Agencies must choose between the discrete policymaking forms permitted by statute.
Once they have chosen a form for a particular action, they are obliged to honor the form's
procedural requirements. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 ( 1969) ("There is
no warrant in law for [an agency] to replace the [APA's] statutory scheme with a rule-making
procedure of its own invention.").
165.
332 U.S. 194 (1947); see also Magill, sufJra note 82, at 1405 (describing Chenery II as "the
fountainhead of this doctrine").
166.
Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 201.
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in the instant case, reasoning that "any rigid requirement to that effect would
make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with
167
many of the specialized problems which arise."
To preserve the flexibility
necessary for effective agency action, the Coun concluded that "the choice
made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is
one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
168
agency."
Subsequent Court cases have reaffirmed Chenery II's basic principle
that federal courts should not readily second guess an agency's choice of
policymaking procedures.
Embedded within this dominant tradition of judicial deference to
agency choice of procedures is an underappreciated countertradition: Not
only is an agency's choice of policymaking procedures reviewable, the choice
may also be reversible if the selected procedures clearly transgress the agency's
169
duties of care or loyalty. In NLRB v. BeU Aerospace Co., the Court speculated
that "there may be situations where the [agency]'s reliance on adjudication
170
would amount to an abuse of discretion."
Some lower courts have seized
upon this "abuse of discretion" language, together with the APA's arbitrary and
capricious standard and the principles of due process, to invalidate agencies'
choice of adjudicatory procedures in contexts where retroactive application
would give individuals insufficient notice of potential deprivations or pose
other special burdens.I71 An agency's decision to employ ex ante legislative rules
rather than ex post adjudication also can be set aside in situations where
procedural due process mandates an individualized hearing in connection with
172
a deprivation of life, liberty, or property.
Furthermore, courts may not
change course from adjudication to rulemaking or vice versa without giving
notice to interested parries and making reasonable accommodation for reliance

167 .
Id. at 202.
168.
Id. at 203 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407.421 (1942)).
169.
416 u.s. 267 (1974).
170.
Id. at 294. The Coun also cautioned, however, that "the choice between rulemaking
and adjudication lies in the first instance within [an agency)'s discretion." Id .
171.
See 1 PIERCE, supra note 127, § 6.9, at 387 (noting that the Due Process Clause and the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of APA § 706(2)(A) have this effect); Magill, supra note 82, at
1408-10 nn.86-88 & 92; see also White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976) ("Fair
and consistent application of such requirements requires that [agencies] establish written standards
and regulations."); Holmes v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) ("[D)ue
process requires that selections among applicants [for public housing] be made in accordance with
'ascertainable standards."') (citation omitted).
See Magill, supra note 82, at 1409; Russell L. Weaver, Chenery II: A Forty-Year Retrospective,
172.
40 ADMIN. L. REV. 161 (1988).
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interests.
Anchoring these decisions is the principle that courts must
perform some review of an agency's choice of policymaking procedures to
ensure that agency discretion does not inordinately "increase the likelihood
of favoritism, partiality, and arbitrariness" in violation of agency duties of care
174
and loyalty.
Regrettably, the principle that courts may review an agency's choice of
policymaking procedures under the APA and the Due Process Clause for reasonable prudence and loyalty remains a shadowy outlier doctrine on the
periphery of administrative law. Courts rarely entertain invitations to scrutinize agencies' choice of procedures where a statute does not prescribe specific
procedural requirements. If the dangers of agency arbitrariness and opportunism are to be taken seriously, however, courts must apply the APA's arbitrary and capricious test and the Due Process Clause more vigorously as default
restraints on agencies' choice of policymaking procedures.
d.

Public Accounting

To facilitate public monitoring, administrative law also compels agencies to satisfy several subsidiary recordkeeping duties. Like private fiduciaries,
agencies bear nonnegotiable duties to make a timely accounting of their
activities and produce documents upon request. The president's power to
demand that agencies give an account of their stewardship for "any Subject
175
So too
relating to the Duties of their ... Offices" falls within this category.
does the Statement and Account Clause requirement that the executive
publish "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures
176
of all public Money." The Freedom of Information Act permits public access
to a variety of documents and information, including published descriptions
of the agencies' methods of operations, procedures, substantive rules, and
statements of policy. 177 Agencies are also obliged to release copies of all final
opinions and adjudications, staff instructions that affect the public, and
178
records of votes by agency officials.
The Government in the Sunshine Act

173.
See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
540-42 (4th eel. 1999) (listing cases); Bressman, supra note 9, at 535 n.348 (describing this as a
"judicial check for arbitrariness").
174.
Holmes, 398 F.2cl at 264.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Individual agency officers must also make extensive
175.
representations concerning "financial disclosure, conflict of interest, and ethics." 5 U.S.C. app.
§ 404 (2000).
176.
U.S. CON ST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 7.
177.
5 U.S. C. § 55Z(a)( 1).
178.
/d. § 552(a)(2)-(5).
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provides for agencies to give advance public notice "of the time, place, and
179
subject matter" of certain agency meetings. Likewise, FACA requires advisory committee meetings to be open to the public and transcribed, and
180
provides for disclosure of virtually all documents used in these meetings.
Where applicable, courts enforce these statutory-disclosure duties to facilitate
both intergovernmental and public monitoring of agency performance.
e.

Remedies

In private law, courts may choose from a diverse assortment of equitable
remedies for breach of fiduciary duty, including specific performance, injunction from future breach, compelled compensation, accounting, appointing a
receiver, suspending or removing a fiduciary, denying compensation, impos181
When administrative
ing a constructive trust, or voiding the fiduciary's act.
agencies violate their fiduciary obligations, however, courts' remedial options
are far more limited. Courts ordinarily enforce the Due Process Clause, the
APA, FACA, and other agency obligations only by declaratory judgment or
prospective injunction, voiding or enjoining agency actions that are procedurally defective, arbitrary and capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary
182
to statutory authority.
Damages, the typical remedy for fiduciary misappropriations, are only available against agencies or agency officials under limited
183
To the extent plaintiffs might seek more invasive forms of
circurnstances.
relief such as the suspension or removal of an agency official or a constructive
trust on agency resources, they must pursue these goals through the political
179.
Id. § 552b(e)(l).
180.
!d. § 552b(f).
See Rounds, supra note 21, at A-5; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 199
181.
(1959) (observing that trust beneficiaries may seek equitable relief to compel performance, enjoin
a breach of trust, compel the trustee to redress a breach, and, in cases of severe and persistent
breach, request that the court remove the trustee and appoint a receiver to receive and administer
the trust property); Cooter & Freedman, supra note 50, at 1074 ("Disgorgement, the usual remedy for
misappropriation, merely aims to return the agent to a situation similar to the one that she would
have been in without appropriation."); DeMott, supra note 63, at 900 ("[A beneficiary may obtain)
restitution of any benefit realized by the fiduciary through the breach, or alternatively may recover
any loss suffered as a result of the breach.").
The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes a federal court to "declare the rights and
182.
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such a declaration" in cases (other than tax)
"of actual controversy within its jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a) (2000).
These include suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(l)
183.
(authorizing the U.S. Court of Federal Claims to consider tort claims based on the conduct of
federal officials), the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (authorizing tort actions against
state or local officials who deprive citizens of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution under color of state law), and implied constitutional causes of action under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and its progeny.
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process rather than the courts. These limits on judicial relief are not necessarily inconsistent with a fiduciary theory of administrative law, though an
argument can be made that the demands of equity, popular sovereignty, and
fiduciary obligation favor giving courts a larger set of tools for remedying
agency malfeasance.

C.

Administrative Law and Social Norms

Notwithstanding the many critical executive, legislative, and judicial
restraints on agency action, the fact remains that the vast majority of agency
decisions are made with little direct oversight or input from the White House.
Few agency regulations or adjudicatory determinations are reviewed or
overturned by the judiciary, and fewer still by Congress or the president.
Indeed, as discussed previously, administrative law deliberately reinforces
agency autonomy by restricting the political branches' residual control over
the administrative process. While agencies' duties of care and loyalty cabin
agency discretion to a certain extent, they do not displace agencies' discretion
to choose between reasonable alternatives.
Viewed from the perspective of the political-control model, which currently dominates administrative law scholarship, agencies' discretion represents an unsettling accountability gap that undermines agency legitimacy. The
emerging fiduciary model, on the other hand, suggests that the apparent
accountability gap may be more complex than critics ordinarily suppose. Like
private fiduciary law, the fiduciary model considers legal restraints to be just
one strand in the intricate web of institutional relations, bureaucratic constraints, and social norms that influence agency behavior. In most contexts,
the extralegal forces that inform agency action have a far more potent effect
for good or ill than hard legal norms. For example, the president may promote
a culture of administrative fidelity by appointing agency heads with compatible regulatory philosophies, maintaining informal lines of communication
with agencies, and fostering constructive public discourse about the adminis184
Congress shapes the social norms surrounding agency identrative process.
tity not only through legislation, but also through formal and informal debate
over pending legislation, formal congressional oversight of the administrative
process, informal dialogue with agency administrators, and committee hearings on regulatory issues. Foreign regulators and nongovernmental organizations
184.

See 1 PIERCE, supra note 127, § 7.9, at 500 ("Presidential reluctance

to assert the power

to implement formal, systematic controls on independent agency policymaking can ... be explained

in part as a function of the President's knowledge that he can exercise control over
policymaking ... through less formal, less systematic means.").
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also play influential roles as evangelists and watchdogs of agency
185
To this list one might add the
professionalism, diligence, and fidelity.
multifarious voices of scientists, industrialists, academics, political parties,
news media, international organizations, and innumerable others.
The idea that socialization processes serve as the first and most important line of defense against agency mismanagement is not unrealistic. Organizational theorists observe that cultural and professional socialization
processes exert a profound influence upon individual and collective behavior,
particularly for public-service professions where the norms of loyalty, care,
and fidelity are deeply engrained in the public conscious. Indeed, one likely
explanation for administrative law's inattention to the emerging fiduciary
model of administrative law may be that the fiduciary model is simply taken
for granted because it is so deeply embedded in public discourse.
Reputation matters deeply to administrative agencies and the individual
administrators at their helms. Most agency administrators, like private fiduciaries, accept the call to service in no small part because they consider the
appointment a mark of personal distinction, and they have powerful incentives
to preserve the honor of their office. Indeed, administrators may care a good
deal more about the reputational harms that flow from public censure than
the legal consequences of an adverse judgment (for which they are not usually
personally liable). An administrator's perceived failure to act with reasonable
prudence can have devastating reputational costs, as illustrated in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina by the news media's excoriation of Federal Emergency
186
Management Agency (FEMA) director, Michael Brown.
In short, the
influence of extralegal norms and social networks can hardly be overestimated.
Administrative law seeks to complement these extralegal socialization
processes by walking a fine line between vigilance and deference. The perils of
underenforcing agency duties are obvious to all, but the effects of overenforcement can be equally destructive. Incessant judicial fault finding can breed
cynicism about the administrative process, make public office less attractive to
high-quality candidates, decrease the marginal reputational costs of
administrator malfeasance, and ultimately undermine the trust upon which

185.
See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 55 (2004) (observing that
international regulatory networks give national agencies "an incentive 'to maintain their reputation
in the eyes of other members of the network"') (quoting Giandomenico Majone, The New
European Agencies: Regulation by lnfonnation, 4 J. ENVTL. PuB. POL'Y 262, 272 (1997).
See, e.g., ABC News, FEMA Director Removed from Katrina Duty (Sept. 9, 2005),
186.
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/HurricaneKatrina/story ?id= 1111 074&page= 1 (reviewing press and
congressional criticism of Michael Brown's performance, competency, and qualifications).
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the administrative state itself depends. Thus, while courts extol soft norms
such as loyalty, diligence, impartiality, rationality, and procedural fairness,
they moderate the political branches' residual control and judicial review in
reliance on the broader web of institutions, networks, and social norms that
constitute the administrative state.
D.

Agency Discretion and Public Trust

The foregoing discussion, sweeping and impressionistic though it might
be, offers a provocative glimpse of the fiduciary model's quiet ascendancy in
administrative law, as well as the model's potential to revitalize critical discourse concerning agency legitimacy. To examine the administrative state
through the lens of fiduciary obligation is to see administrative agencies as
institutions suspended in an intricate web of legal, social, and political constraints that infonn and delimit agency discretion. On the one hand, administrative law empowers the political branches to exercise residual control over
agency activities and enforces agencies' fiduciary duties as safeguards against
arbitrariness, opportunism, and waste. But administrative law also places
restrictions on these accountability mechanisms, entrusting agencies with
policymaking discretion in order to maximize the benefits from agency specialization. While legal theorists have tended in the past to treat agency
expertise, interest representation, and political accountability as competing
188
approaches to the problem of agency discretion,
the fiduciary model
suggests that these elements should be integrated and coordinated to maximize
agency fidelity.
The fiduci ary model's vision of agency discretion as public trust might
strike some as a perilously utopian conception of the administrative state. To
expect virtue, however, is not necessarily to turn a blind eye to vice. Like
private fiduciary law, administrative law girds the soft norms of fiduciary obligation with the steely realism of residual political control and judicial review.
The fiduciary norms embodied in the Due Process Clause, the APA, and
other procedural statutes give courts the flexibility to counter agency opportunism, factionalism, arbitrariness, and waste in whatever novel form they

187.
See Larry E. Ribstein, The Scructure of the Fiduciary Relationship 45 (Univ. of Ill. Law &
Econ. Research Paper No. LE03-003, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=397641
("!Overuse of fiduciary duties] inc reases litigation and contracting costs, decreases the effectiveness of
owners' governance rights, and dilutes true fiduciaries ' legal and extralegal incentives.").
See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 127, at 439 (reviewing five legal "approaches" to restraining
188.
agency discretion).
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189
might arise. By balancing agency discretion, political control, and fiduciary
duties, administrative law seeks to enhance agency productivity while at the
same time cultivating a legal, political, and social climate conducive to conscientious governance.

Ill.

DISAGGREGATING THE FIDUCIARY MODEL

Thus far, this Article has explored the fiduciary model's nuanced
response to the dilemma of agency discretion without pausing to reflect upon
agencies' diverse forms and functions. Conventional wisdom assumes that
190
agency discretion differs only in degree, but this assumption does not withstand close scrutiny. Agencies perform diverse functions, from the conduct of
national diplomacy, to the management of public lands and property, to the
licensing of private parties for television and radio broadcasting. Some agencies manage public goods, while others regulate private conduct; some are
under the president's direct command and control, while others are designated "independent" and insulated from executive management; some have
the power to issue legally binding rules, but others play a purely investigatory
or consultative role. This impressive functional diversity suggests that the
delegation of authority to administrative agencies may be best understood not
as a linear continuum but rather as a heterogeneous family of distinct but
interrelated species.
One virtue of the fiduciary model is that it offers a flexible framework for
preserving administrative law from the centripetal forces of agency diversity.191 Like private fiduciary law, administrative law calibrates entrustment,
residual control, and fiduciary duties in different ways for different types of
legal relations. Courts typically take for granted that administrative agencies
189.
See Markham, supra note 19, at 256 ("The [fiduciary) concept .. . allows the courts . . . to
proscribe socially undesirable activities that were not anticipated by the legislature or which are too
novel for application of the strict confines of the common law. It assures that those who may engage
in sharp practices and prey on the unwary do not escape retribution through legal loopholes.") .
See Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the "New" Nondelegation
190.
Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6 (2000) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
415 (1989) (Scalia,}., dissenting)).
See E. Donald Elliot, The Dis-Integration of Administrative Law: A Comment on Shapiro,
191.
in FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 380 (questioning "whether the
traditional conception of administrative law as 'embrac[ing] all governmental machinery for
carrying out government programs' remains viable (if it ever was)"); Stewart, supra note 5, at 167071 n.S ("The conception of administrative law as a unified body of doctrine with general
applicability risks papering over significant differences in administrative functions, agency forms,
and the sources and operative foci of various administrative law doctrines."); Mark Seidenfeld,
The Quixotic Quest for a "Unified" Theory of the Administrative State, in ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP ( 2005), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art2.
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12
are agents of the executive branch, Congress, or the people as a whole, ' but
the fiduciary model suggests that other fiduciary relations such as trusts, corporations, and guardianships may also serve as illuminating analogs for
administrative agencies' roles in public governance.

A.

The Principal-Agent Paradigm

The traditional principal-agent paradigm posits that administrative
agencies represent the people or their representatives (the principal) and are
expected to conform their behavior to the principal's current preferences.
Agencies receive specific statutory directions and are expected to exercise
discretion only to respond to complex or unforeseen circumstances. Even
where circumstances compel agencies to exercise discretion, agencies' choices
are not intended to be fully discretionary; rather, agencies are expected to
anticipate how the principal would decide the question under consideration.191 Viewed from this perspective, delegation to administrative agencies
empowers the government as a whole to act more effectively in more areas
while maximizing the principal's control over agency performance.
This principal-agent paradigm, which has been embraced in various iterations by adherents of the political-control model, fits some administrative
agencies fairly comfortably. Agencies that are subject to direct presidential
control and closely linked to the president's constitutional powers (for
example, foreign affairs and national defense) arguably operate in a relationship
with the political branches that closely parallels traditional principal-agent
relations. The State and Defense Departments, for example, have cabinetlevel administrators who report directly to the president and may be dismissed
and replaced at the president's pleasure. In theory, the president has
authority to set agency policy and to discipline administrators who refuse to
follow the administration's policy. For such agencies, at least, administrative
law fashions a fiduciary relationship in which the president and Congress
exercise managerial authority over agencies as proxies for the sovereign people.
192.
See, e.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516 (1911) (asserting that "in
authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to meet these loca l conditions, Congress was merely
conferring administrative functions upon an age nt"); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll &
Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 ( 1989) (using a principal-agent model to exa min e
the roles of Congress and the president in ove rsight of the administrative process ); Pierce, supra
note II, at 1239-40 (positing agencies as agents of "the people"); Shapiro, supra note II, at I
(modeling "the relationship between an agency and its politic<~l overseers-the presidenr and
Congress-as one of 'principal' and 'agent"').
193.
See M arga ret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout , A Team Product ion Th eory of Cor[JOrate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247,258-59 (1999).
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Strong policy arguments support the principal-agent model where
administrative agencies discharge core executive functions. As the one elected
official chosen by and answerable to the entire voting citizenry, the president
194
is uniquely situated "to hear and act upon the voice of all the people."
Allowing the president to stand in with Congress as a principal for the people
centralizes administrative policy under executive control, streamlines agency
195
The president's
decisionmaking, and facilitates agency accountability.
heightened role arguably energizes and focuses public administration, improves
inter-agency coordination, and "enable[s] the President to defend himself
196
from constitutional encroachments on his powers by the legislature."
Conventional wisdom holds that the president also stands above the fray of
regional politics and thus is better positioned than Congress to withstand
. l pressures. 197
facuona
For pure executive agencies, the president's strong residual-control rights
198
When
may also soothe anxiety about agency countermajoritarianism.
Congress delegates authority to an agency rather than resolve the disputed
issue itself, it distances regulatory policy from majoritarian democratic
processes. Administrative agencies that have a national agenda and regulate a
diffuse nationwide class may face strong temptations to abuse their authority
to advance narrow interests-for example, by awarding government contracts
194.
Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex
World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987,990-91 (1997).
195.
See Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modem State: Why a Unitary, Centralized
Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827,845,847 (1996).
196.
Calabresi, supra note 8, at 37; see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President
and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 103 (1995) ("In order to be faithful to the original
design . . . the interpreter must see as part of the constitutional structure a constraint not explicitly
stated in that design, requiring that certain kinds of [administrative] policymaking remain within
the control of the executive.").
197.
See Kagan, supra note 127, at 2335 ("[B]ecause the President has a national constituency,
he is likely to consider in setting the direction of administrative policy on an ongoing basis, the
preferences of the general public, rather than merely parochial interests."). But see Jide Nzelibe,
The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217 (2006)
(describing and critiquing this conventional wisdom).
198.
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 19-20 (1962); Rebecca
L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 553 (1998)
(reviewing the countermajoritarian difficulty in administrative law). Some scholars argue that
administrative agencies are, in fact, fundamentally promajoritarian institutions because noticeand-comment procedures make them more accessible to the public input than the president or
Congress. See, e.g., jERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 144 (1997) (arguing
that vague delegations reduce legislative logrolling by taking issues out of Congress's hands); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, in FOUNDATIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 4, at 180 ("Strangely enough it may make sense to imagine the
delegation of political authority to administrators as a device for improving the responsiveness of
government to the desires of the electorate.").
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to favored contractors outside fair and open bidding processes -and they
are therefore good candidates for strong residual control.
Fitting within the principal-agent paradigm are such diverse institutions
as the Defense Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal
Revenue Service, and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency. Direct
presidential control over these and other agencies enhances the energy of
government, improves interagency coordination, and places agency action
more firmly within the realm of electoral accountability. While the president
may also face regional or factional pressures, White House review at least
provides a second tier of oversight, decreasing the danger of agency capture.
The president's heightened residual control thus helps to ensure that legislative appropriations for national purposes or charitable causes do not become
hot spots for rent seekers, industry insiders, and other opportunists.
The principal-agent paradigm is far less compelling both descriptively
and prescriptively, however, when the spotlight moves from core executive
agencies, such as the State Department and the Defense Department, to other
species of agencies within the administrative state. Many administrative
agencies perform roles that bear little resemblance to traditional principalagent relations but mirror trusts, corporations, guardianships, or other fiduciary
relations. For every agency headed by cabinet-level administrators who
report directly to the president, there is an independent regulatory commission
or quasi-independent federal corporation that breaks the principal-agent
100
Many administrative agencies exercise authority by delegation from
mold.
Congress with relatively little presidential control. If the administrative state
must be viewed solely from a principal-agent perspective, the administrative
state's legitimacy would be in serious jeopardy.
Even ardent supporters of the political-control model acknowledge that
heightened political control is not desirable in all contexts. Excessive political intermeddling in fields such as environmental regulation or federal interest
rates could significantly diminish the returns from agencies' special expertise
and result in distorted policies that do not reflect the public's long-term
199.
See , e.g., Mary Curtis & Joel Havemann, A Long Road to Recovery: FEMA Reopening Its
No-Bid Contracts , L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2005, at A21; CBS News, Pentagon Probes Halliburton Bid
(Oct. 25, 2004 ), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/ll /nationaVmain635356.shtml (describing
claims by "a top Army contracting official that a Halliburton C o. subsidiary unfairly won no-bid
contracts worth billions of dollars fo r support services in Iraq and the Balkans").
See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
200.
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 583-84 (1984 ). The Freedom of Information Act defines
the tenn "agency'' to "include[] any executive department, Government corporation, Government
controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government ... , or any
independent regulatory agency." 5 U.S. C.§ 552(1)( 1) (2000).
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priorities.zo As the president's control over an agency increases, the potential
efficiency and expertise gains from the fiduciary relation decrease, weakening
202
Moreover, few would
Congress's incentive to delegate in the first place.
dispute that certain forms of agency action, such as the Veterans
Administration's adjudication of individual disability claims or the Social
Security Administration's adjudication of social security benefits, should be
decided on a case-by-case basis by neutral administrative law judges rather
203
than by elected officials through traditional political processes. Nor would
it seem wise to replace the trustees of the Social Security and Medicare trust
204
For
funds with agents who could be dismissed at the president's pleasure.
agencies such as these, it might be appropriate to look beyond the principalagent paradigm.
B.

Alternative Paradigms: Trust, Corporation, and Guardianship

Where administrative agencies exercise independent rulemaking or
adjudicatory functions, administrative law tracks trust law more closely than
agency law. Consider, for example, so-called independent agencies such as the
FTC and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which
manage public resources and regulate private interests for the people as a
whole. When these agencies exercise rulemaking authority pursuant to an
implicit delegation from Congress, they are not necessarily expected to
anticipate how Congress or the president would respond to novel regulatory
201.
See Merrill, supra note 74, at 2153 ("Broad delegation is necessary .. . to leverage up the
lawmaking function of government in order to generate the volume of regulations necessary to carry
out the wide-ranging functions of modem government."); Shapiro, supra note 11, at 20 ("[O)versight
by generalists is more likely to improve the rationality of regulatory policy when it supplies the
general preferences or values that an agency should follow. In other words, overseers are unlikely
to improve the regulatory process when they engage in micromanagement.") (footnote omitted) .
See David Epstein & Sharyn O 'Halloran, The Nondelegatian Doctrine and the Separation
202 .
of Powers : A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 963 (1999) ("[D)elegation
implies surrendering at least some control over policy, and legislators will be loathe to relinquish
authority in politically sensitive policy areas where they cannot be assured that the executive
branch will carry out their intent."); Krent, supra note 97, at 748 ("Presumably, the more that
couns require the President ro exercise control over all agencies, the less attractive that delegation
becomes from Congress' standpoint. Congress would be less able to influence the exercise of
delegated authority and thereby earn the gratitude of constituents.") .
See Fitts, supra note 195, at 852.
203 .
204.
The Social Securiry and Medicare trust funds are administered by a board of trustees
comprised of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, the Commissioner of Social Security, and two additional members appointed by
the president and confirmed by the Senate. See SOCIAL SEC. & MEDICARE BDS. OFTRS., STATUS
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF THE 2006 ANNUAL
REPORTS (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/trsummary.html.
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problems. Instead, these agencies have broad discretion to exercise their discretion according to their own perception of the public interest, as informed
205
by their unique expertise and experience.
Congress deliberately insulates
these agencies from the president's "coercive influence" by providing that the
president may remove administrators only "for good cause"-the same stan206
dard applicable to trustees.
For independent regulatory agencies, the trustee analogy has an additional advantage: It accounts for the pluralistic interests that are implicated in
agency entrustment. Whereas the principal-agent paradigm envisions a binary
relation between agencies and the political branches, the trust paradigm treats
administrative agencies' beneficiaries as distinct stakeholders in administrative
regulation. As discussed previously, many agencies direct their services at a
subset of the voting citizenry, noncitizens, or groups that cut across national
allegiances. For agency activities that affect Indian tribes, for example, the
Supreme Court has proclaimed this trustee-beneficiary relationship explicitly,
stating that the federal government "has charged itself with moral obligations
of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct ... should therefore be judged
207
by the most exacting fiduciary standards."
The agency and trust paradigms
thus entail distinct roles and relations (bilateral vs. multilateral) and
emphasize different types of discretion (implementation vs. policymaking) and
different values (public will vs. public welfare, flexibility vs. commitment).
Congress typically designs administrative agencies according to the trust
paradigm rather than the agency paradigm when it wishes to enhance the

205.
See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944) (upholding a delegation to
the Price Administrator to set prices that "in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will
effectuate the purposes of this Act") (quoting Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, § 2(a), 56 Stat. 23,
24 (1942) (emphasis added)).
206.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,410-11 (1989) (citation omitted); see also
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,629 (1935) (discussing the "for cause" standard);
cf. R2>'TATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 37 (2003) (providing that trustees may be removed "(a) in
accordance with the terms of the trust; or (b) for cause by a proper court"). The Court indicated
in Humphrey's Execuwr that the president would have broader constitutional removal authority over
"purely executive officers" based on the general principle that "lw]hether the power of the President
to remove an officer shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power ... wiU
depend upon rhe character of rhe office." Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 631-32 (emphasis added).
207.
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942); see also Morongo Band of
Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1998) ("It is true that agencies of the federal
government owe a fiduciary responsibility to Indian tribes.") (citations omitted); Leonard M.
Baynes, Deregulatory Injustice and Electronic Redlining: The Color of Access to Telecommunications,
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 263, 308 (2004) ("[P]ursuant to their trust responsibility, federal
administrative agencies have to meet strong fiduciary standards in their dealings with American
Indians unless Congress, through its plenary power, has expressly authorized the agency to depart
from them.").
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credibility of regulatory decisions and forge commitment. Agency independence arguably enhances the credibility of agencies' adjudicatory and
rulemaking proceedings by distancing agency decisions from the political
process. Establishing independent administrative agencies also promotes continuity of policy from administration to administration, since independent
agencies are bound to perform their statutory functions in good faith even if
the statutory standards set by Congress become politically unpalatable to the
current administration. The cadre of commitment-reinforcing agencies might
include such diverse institutions as the Department of Veterans Affairs, the
ITC, and the National Labor Relations Board. Insulating these agencies from
presidential control increases the likelihood that federal agencies will identify
appropriate beneficiaries through rational, legalistic processes rather than
based on political preferences. While Congress's decision to entrust authority to
these independent agencies might dilute Congress's accountability and
diminish the president's ability to shepherd regulatory policy, agency autonomy also reduces the risk that majoritarian political pressures will undermine
statutory objectives and thereby enhances the perceived credibility of agency
decisionmaking. Indeed, one reason why Congress insulates independent agencies from the president's control is precisely to prevent short-term majoritarian pressures (to which the president may be uniquely vulnerable} from
compromising enduring statutory or constitutional commitments.
Other private fiduciary relations might also serve as useful paradigms for
conceptualizing certain types of administrative agencies. Where legislation
tasks administrative agencies (generally at the state level) with fulfilling the
state's parens patriae responsibilities for juveniles or the mentally disabled, the
fiduciary law of guardianship might also serve as a useful model for agency
authority. Federal corporations such as the Federal Depository Insurance
Corporation hew to the corporate form more closely than the principal-agent
or trust paradigms. Certain independent regulatory commissions such as the
Federal Election Commission (FEC), the ITC, and the U.S. Sentencing
Commission arguably perform a "mediating hierarch" role analogous to corporate directors by intermediating conflicts between political parties, government bodies, voters, interest groups, and other groups in order to
209
These corporate law paradigms
maximize value for the state as a whole.
208.
See ELY, supra note 4, at 87-88; Brown, supra note 198, at 550 (reviewing the
countermajoritarian difficulty in administrative law) .
209.
For an introduction to the "mediating hierarch" conception of corporate directors, see
Blair & Stout, supra note 193, at 284-85. In contrast to the agency and trust paradigms, corporate
paradigms tend to view administrative agencies as stakeholders in the regulatory process. See Victor
Brudney, Contract arui Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595 , 624 (1997) ("In the
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draw upon Robert Reich's v1s1on of agency administrators as quasiindependent "interest-group intermediators" who may maximize social welfare
210
In contrast to
and advance social learning about the stakes of regulation.
pure executive agencies, independent agencies that stand apart from partisan
politics and set the ground rules for the political branches' exercise of political
power serve as process-reinforcing or pluralism-reinforcing referees rather
than reflexive servants of the president's majoritarian will.m

C.

Disaggregating Agency Fidelity

In proposing trusts, corporations, guardianships, and other private fiduciary relations as alternatives to the agency paradigm, I do not intend to suggest that all administrative agencies can, or should, be pigeon-holed within
one of these private-law paradigms. Analogies between administrative agencies
and particular fiduciary relations become artificial, constrictive, and ultimately absurd if stretched too far. As with any metaphor that bears a kernel of
tmth, however, comparisons between administrative law and the various
branches of fiduciary law are useful for highlighting distinctions that might
otherwise elude detection.
Perhaps most important, the emerging fiduciary model in administrative
law reveals the competing visions of public trust that are implicit in agency
diversity. The principal-agent model focuses on agencies' fidelity to majority
will by placing agencies firmly under the management of the incumbent
president-the one elected official who is accountable to a national constituency and therefore uniquely sensitive to evolving national preferences. The
trustee paradigm, in contrast, calls upon independent agencies to honor fixed
legislative commitments so as to enhance the credibility of administrative policy
over time. For the corporation and corporate-director paradigms, agency fidelity
might be measured against a different set of metrics such as the degree of public
participation in interest-group deliberation or the agency's objective
efficiency and productivity. The fiduciary model does not necessarily privilege
any particular vision of agency fidelity, nor does it offer guidance as to which
fiduciary paradigm Congress should employ in any particular context.

case of trusts or principal and agent relationships (and pro tanw of corporate management), the
fiduciary must act for the beneficiary's exclusive benefit, and, in the case of partnership or
corporate contro llers for their shared benefit in proportions designated ex ante.").
Reich, supra note 5, at 1626-27 .
210.
William Eskridge offers pluralism facilitation as a refinement of John Hart Ely's
211.
representation- reinfo rcement mcxlel in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Disrrusr: How
Courts Can SufJporc Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Policies , 114 YALE L.J . 12 79 (2005 ).
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Instead, the fiduciary model honors Congress's autonomy as proxy settlor for
the people to select the type of agency entrustment and the corresponding
vision of agency fidelity that best matches the public's own conception of the
, goOO .ZIZ
pu bl tc

IV.

FIDELITY BY DESIGN

By highlighting the fiduciary norms implicit in administrative law, the
interpretivist fiduciary model also reveals areas where administrative law fails
to accomplish its purposes and provides strategies for refining the law to enhance
agency fidelity. By way of illustration, this part examines two areas where the
model pushes administrative law in new directions: ( 1) beneficiary standing
213
to challenge agency action; and ( 2) due process restraints on agency action.
A.

Standing and Representation

If administrative agencies serve as fiduciaries by delegation from the
people, how should this understanding inform standing doctrine? Some
scholars have suggested that agencies' representative role militates in favor of
a sweeping expansion to citizen standing. Others have advocated scrapping
214
standing as an analytic step independent of the cause of action. The fiduciary model offers an intermediate solution: Courts should preserve standing
doctrine's "zone-of-interests" test but expand the set of Article III "injuries in
fact" to embrace abstract injuries that undermine agency accountability.
The fiduciary model posits standing as an inquiry into the plaintiffs
interest, injury, and ability to represent the beneficiary class. In private fiduciary
law, beneficiaries and their representatives are the only parties who have
standing to bring suit for breach of fiduciary duty. Principals may sue their
agents to recover property lost to self-interested transactions. Trust beneficiaries
may sue trustees for breach of fiduciary duty once they demonstrate their
215
Likewise, corporate derivative
individual beneficial interest to the court.
212 .
See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) ("The authority of
Congress, in creating quasi legislative or quasi judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of
their duties independently of executive control cannot well be doubted .... ") .
213 .
Clearly, these two proposals are mere starting points for future investigation of the
fiduciary model's neglected normative dimensions. I suspect that other valuable insights could be
gained, for example, by subjecting administrative law to more rigorous linguistic and economic analysis.
See , e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Scruccure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J . 221 (1988); Cass
214.
R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988) ; Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article Ill , 91 MICH. L. REV.
163 (1992) .
See 3 SCOTI & FRATCHER, supra note 19, § 214, at 318.
215 .
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suits are premised on the notion that corporate officers owe fiduciary duties to
shareholder beneficiaries. In fiduciary relations where no particular beneficiaries
have a justiciable interest in the fiduciary's performance (for example, charitable
trusts), the state attorney general or another designated public official may
represent the inchoate class of beneficiaries in a suit to enforce the fiduciary's
216
Courts generally grant standing liberally to those who can establish
duties.
a discrete injury arising from a beneficial interest, provided that the prospective
litigant establishes that he will adequately represent the interests of his
similarly situated co-beneficiaries. Fiduciary law thus grants standing liberally
to those who have a justiciable interest, but it also seeks "to protect the
interests of the other beneficiaries" from inadequate representation.
Standing in administrative law is similar to private fiduciary law in
many respects. Where individuals seek to vindicate rights conferred by federal statute, courts examine "whether the interest sought to be protected by
the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
217
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."
Many federal statutes, like trusts, create beneficial interests or impose special burdens
upon limited classes rather than the people as a whole. The Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978m expressly prohibits judicial review except for actions initiated
by gas producers. The Federal Communications Act, for its part, takes a more
liberal approach, granting standing to "any ... person aggrieved or whose
219
interests are adversely affected by any [agency] decision." Absent an express
provision for judicial review, courts look to the statutory scheme as a whole
for signs as to whether Congress intended to draw a particular class of plaintiffs
within the statute's zone of interests. When in doubt, courts tend to resolve
220
ambiguities in favor of inclusion in the zone of interests. The zone-of-interests
test thus aims to identify the parties whom Congress has identified as
interested stakeholders in the regulatory process.
Aside from the prudential zone-of-interests test, the Supreme Court has
held that the Case or Controversy Clause of Article III limits standing to
216.
See 4A id. § 348, at 5.
217.
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (emphasis added).
Within the confines of Article III, Congress may expand or narrow "the class of people who may
protest administrative action." /d. at 154.
218.
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
219.
3 PIERCE, supra note 127, § 16.9, at 1189 (citation omitted).
220.
See, e.g., Nat'! Credit Union Admin. v. First Nm'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479,
498 ( 1998) (holding that the applicable test is whether a particular plaintiff is arguably within the
"zone of interests," not whether Congress "specifically intended to benefit a particular class of
plaintiffs"); Camp, 397 U.S. m 154 ("[T]he trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who
may protest administrative action.").
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plaintiffs who can establish that "the challenged action has caused him injury
222
221
in fact."
This "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" demands
223
that a plaintiffs injury be "concrete," "particularized," or "distinct and
224
palpable." Put simply, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable
to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by
225
the requested relief." Article III thus prevents federal courts from dispensing
advisory opinions on abstract legal questions and ensures that a litigant's
personal stake in the litigation will be sufficient "to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
226
largely depends for illumination of difficult ... questions."
Applying the injury-in-fact requirement, the Supreme Court has stressed
repeatedly that individuals' "abstract" interest in the federal government's
fidelity to constitutional and statutory norms does not give rise to private
standing. This principle, like the zone-of-interests test, has prudential undertones: Allowing a private citizen to air "general grievances" against administrative agencies in federal court would "convert the Judiciary into an open
forum for the resolution of political or ideological disputes about the perform227
"The proposition that all constitutional provisions are
ance of govemment."
enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiar228
ies of those provisions has no boundaries," the Court has warned.
Implicit in
this justification are two assumptions: ( 1) Agencies are otherwise accountable to
the people for their performance through the political branches; and (2) selective
enforcement of agency duties by Congress and the president is more likely to
reflect the will of the people as a whole than private "special-interest"

221.
Camp, 397 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added); see generally 3 PIERCE, supra note 127, § 16.3,
at 1118-21. The APA likewise grants standing to persons "suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by the agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
222.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
223.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984).
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); see aLso Lujan v. Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n, 497
224.
U.S. 871, 894 (1990) ("[W)e intervene in the administration of the laws only when, and to the
extent that, a specific 'final agency action' has an actual or immediately threatened effect.")
(citation omitted).
225.
Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citation omitted); see aLso Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
226.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974)
("Only concrete injury presents the factual context within which a court, aided by parties who
argue within the context, is capable of making decisions.").
227.
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227.
228.
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litigation.
Viewed from this perspective, the Court's prudential approach
toward abstract injuries can be seen as a promajoritarian approach to standing.
This vision of Article lll's injury-in-fact requirement is consistent
with-if not necessarily compelled by-the fiduciary model of the administrative state. In private law, beneficiaries commonly enforce their interests in
fiduciary petformance through intermediators. For example, principals typically rely on their direct agents to monitor and enforce subagents' fiduciary
210
duties as "the subagent's principal and the guarantor of his petformance."
When subagents violate their fiduciary duties to principals, principals ordinarily enforce fiduciary duties by seeking relief in the first instance from their
direct agents rather than their subagents. Corporate law takes this preference a
step further, requiring aggrieved shareholders to ask the corporation as a
whole to take action before filing their own independent derivative suit
against management. Fiduciary law permits private enforcement actions under
limited circumstances, but it treats suits by individual beneficiaries as, at best,
a second-class mechanism for remedying breaches of fiduciary duty.
In contrast to fiduciary law, the Court's prudential approach to abstract
injuries in the administrative law context generates enforcement loopholes in
situations where beneficiaries' discrete and insular status or agency actions
undermine their ability to enforce fiduciary duties through the political process.
This problem is likely to arise in the context of independent agencies; where
the president's control over agencies is weak, the incumbent administration
may struggle to hold independent agencies accountable for breaching the
duties of care and loyalty. More troubling still are agency actions that interfere
with the political process directly by, for example, restricting voting rights or
concealing agency activity from public scrutiny. If the Court's antipathy toward
abstract or "generalized" injuries reflects a commitment to democratic representation, its heavy prudential gloss should dissolve when agency actions threaten
the democratic process itself.m
The Court has taken some small steps toward recognizing the need for
broader citizen standing in cases where the political process could not effectively
229.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 ( 1972); see also Valley Forge Christian Coli.
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 488--90 (1982) (arguing aga inst a
departure from the requirement of a concrete injury in fact because this wou ld treat "[t]he
existence of injured parties who might not wish to bring suit [as] irrelevant").
230.
W . EDWARD SELL, SELLON AGENCY 130-31 (1975).
231.
Once again, these observations from the fiduciary model dovetail nicely with representationreinforcement responses to agency countermajoritarianism. According to Ely's famous formula,
democratic institutions may delegate decisions to institutions that are nor directly accounwble to
the people where necessary to safeguard the rights of discrete and insular minori ti es. See Anupam
Chander, Globalization and Disrrust, 114 YALE L.J . 1193 , 1203 (2005) (outlining "Ely's sy llogism").
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remedy abstract or general injuries. In FEC v. Akins, for instance, the Court
held that a group of U.S. citizens had standing as voters to enforce the
233
Federal Election Campaign Act's (FECA) recordkeeping and disclosure
234
requirements for groups that qualify as "political committee[s]." Justice Breyer,
writing for the majority, held that plaintiffs' "injury in fact" was "their inability
to obtain information-lists of [political committee] donors ... and campaign235
Although
related contributions and expenditures" allegedly required by law.
such "informational" injuries are not ordinarily considered to have the
"concrete" character necessary to survive Article Ill, the case for private
standing becomes more compelling when coupled with Justice Breyer's
observation that the "injury at issue [is] directly related to voting, the most
236
Since the FEC's failure to enforce the FECA's
basic of political rights."
recordkeeping and disclosure requirements eviscerated the public's right to
monitor activity that could potentially prejudice the electoral system as a whole,
the Court acted reasonably in setting aside its prudential antipathy toward
abstract injuries under Article Ill.
This representation-reinforcement conception of Article Ill standing
237
has not always prevailed. In United States v. Richardson, the Court held 5-4
that individual U.S. citizens and taxpayers lack standing to challenge the
Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) refusal to disclose its expenditures as
238
required under the Statement and Account Clause.
In the majority opinion
authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court did not deny that the plaintiffs had
an interest in the CIA's prospective disclosure but concluded that the interest
was nonjusticiable because it was "plainly undifferentiated and 'common to
239
all members of the public."' The majority reasoned that the duty to enforce
the CIA's disclosure duties "is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and
ultimately to the political process" because "[a]ny other conclusion would mean
that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of an
Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct
240
of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts."
232.
524 u.s. 11 (1998).
233.
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431--455 (2000)).
234.
Akins, 524 U.S. at 13.
235.
Id.at21.
236.
Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added).
237.
418 u.s. 166 (1974).
238.
Id. at 167-68.
239.
Id. at 177 (citing Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633,634 (1937) (per curiam); Laird v. Tatum,
408 u.s. 1, 13 (1972)).
240.
Id. at 179.
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Although spumed by the Richardson majority, the representationreinforcement theory of Article III finds eloquent expression in Richardson's
four dissents. Consider Justice Douglas's rebuttal:
History shows that the curse of government is not always venality;
secrecy is one of the most tempting coverups to save regimes from
criticism .. . .
The sovereign in this Nation is the people, not the bureaucracy.
The statement of accounts of public expenditures goes to the heart of
the problem of sovereignty. If taxpayers may not ask that rudimentary
question, their sovereignty becomes an empty symbol and a secret
bureaucracy is allowed to run our affairs . . . . The mandate [of Article I,
Section 9, clause 7] runs to the Congress and to the agencies it creates to
make "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money." The beneficiary-as is abundantly clear
from the constitutional history-is the public. The public cannot intelligently know how to exercise the franchise unless it has a basic
knowledge concerning at least the generality of the accounts under every
241
head of government.

Justice Stewart's complementary dissent links this vision of popular sovereignty
to principles of private legal obligation :
When a party is seeking a judicial determination that a defendant owes
him an affirmative duty, it seems clear to me that he has standing to
litigate the issue of the existence vel non of this duty once he shows that
the defendant has declined to honor his claim ....
. . . It seems to me that when the asserted duty is, as here, as particularized, palpable, and explicit as those which courts regularly recognize in
private contexts, it should make no difference that the obligor is the
242
Government and the duty is embodied in our organic law.

The common threads interlacing FEC and the Richardson dissents are
the corollary principles that administrative agencies bear a duty of solemn
fidelity to the law, and that the beneficiaries of agency action must have an
adequate opportunity to monitor and redress agency lawlessness--if not through
the political process, then through civil actions in federal courts. These
principles apply not only to so-called "informational harms" such as those
alleged in FEC and Richardson, but also to political harms related to voting
rights, free speech and press rights, and other violations of administrative

241.
242.

/d. at !98, 201 (Douglas, J.,dissenting) .
/d. at 203--04 (Stewart, J., dissenting) .
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agencies' general duties of loyalty or care. 243 The principles may also apply
where independent agencies exercise discretion with little executive or
legislative oversight or control. If agencies abuse their discretion in a context
where citizens cannot vindicate their interests through the political process,
individual citizens' abstract or generalized interests in agency legality should
satisfy the Article III injury-in-fact requirement.
Of course, expanding federal jurisdiction under Article III to allow private enforcement actions in cases such as FEC and Richardson merely
exchanges one representation dilemma for another. Private parties who sue
administrative agencies to enforce the agencies' constitutional or statutory
duties step into the agencies' shoes as a "representative of the public interest" or
244
"private attorney general." Granting individuals standing to enforce agency
duties thus raises the same dangers of opportunism, collusion, and carelessness
that haunt administrative law generally, and courts should take appropriate
action to ensure that private litigants adequately discharge their fiduciary
responsibilities. As in derivative actions, courts could demand that private litigants not only exhaust all available administrative remedies but also file formal grievance notices with the White House or Congress. Better still, courts
could require prospective plaintiffs to demonstrate that they will adequately
represent the public interest as a whole. Petitions to participate as amicus
curiae in representative citizen suits could be granted liberally. Courts could
also emphasize plaintiffs' fiduciary duties to the public in suits to enforce
245
general constitutional and statutory norms. These measures would ensure that
agencies are accountable for breaches of their fiduciary duties while
protecting the public from arbitrary, wasteful, or opportunistic behavior by the
private attorneys general who litigate on its behalf.
B.

Recalibrating Agency Duties

A second proposal that arises from the fiduciary model addresses the
delicate balance between administrative agencies' discretion and accountability: Administrative law should apply agencies' procedural duties of care and

243.
Cf. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) (holding that individuals who reside in
a district that is the subject of a racial-gerrymandering claim do not have standing to challenge
legislation creating that district unless they were personally subjected to racial classification).
244.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 ( 1972).
See Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949) (noting
245.
that stockholders in derivative lawsuits sue as fiduciaries for other stockholders) (citing Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)).
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loyalty more rigorously in contexts where the political branches' formal
constraints on agency behavior are weak.
In private fiduciary law, courts calibrate fiduciary duties differently for
different types of fiduciary relations to account for the variability of beneficiary control. "The greater the independent authority to be exercised by the
246
fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty," Austin Scott explains.
"Thus, a trustee is under a stricter duty of loyalty than is an agent upon
whom limited authority is conferred or a corporate director who can act only
147
as a member of the board of directors . ... "
The scope and potency of a
fiduciary's duties to beneficiaries is directly related to the vulnerability of
beneficiaries. Trustees are subject to broader duties of care and loyalty than
agents because they enjoy more autonomy than most other fiduciaries and
are not subject to the market forces that protect shareholders in public
corporations, both of which heighten the dangers of trustee mismanagement.
Trust beneficiaries cannot readily trade their beneficial interests for interests
in other trusts if they are dissatisfied with the trustee's performance. Because
beneficiaries are more vulnerable to trustee shirking or cheating, courts tend
to enforce trustees' fiduciary duties more strictly than the fiduciary duties of
.
248
agents or d1rectors.
Administrative law should internalize the lessons of private fiduciary law
and enforce administrative agencies' duties more strictly in contexts where
agencies operate at a greater remove from executive control. Consider, for
example, the respective roles of ordinary U.S. Attorneys offices within the
Department of Justice (DO]) and the office of independent or special counsel, as
249
designated for ad hoc investigations of high-ranking government officials.
Both U.S. Attorneys and special counsel are federal prosecutors. Both are vested
with discretion to determine the amount of resources devoted to a particular
investigation, how the investigation will be conducted, whether to dose the
investigation or seek an indictment, the persons against whom indictments will
be sought and on what charges, whether to accept a guilty plea, and what
recommendations the government will make for sentencing. However, because
the special counsel enjoys greater autonomy from executive oversight, the

246.
Scott, supra note 245, at 541.
24 7.
/d. ; see also Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligatirm, 9 OXIDRD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 319
( 1989) (obsetving that fiduciary obligations depend on the nature of the trust reposed in the entiry}.
See Scott & Scott, supra note 23, at 2423.
248.
249.
The Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (2000), which previously
governed the appointment of independent counsel for investigation of executive officials, expired
in July 1999 but remains in effect with respect to matters pending before previously appointed
independent counsel. See id. § 599.
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fiduciary duties of loyalty and care should exert an even stronger gravitational
pull upon the special counsel than they do upon ordinary federal prosecutors.
For ordinary federal prosecutions, concerns about the dangers of prosecutorial discretion are mitigated by strong political and social controls. The
attorney general, U.S. Attorneys, and inferior officers operate under the
White House's oversight and serve at the president's pleasure. Congress also
monitors the DOJ's activities and influences the OOJ's performance through
oversight hearings and its firm grip on the DO]'s purse strings. Budgetary
constraints ordinarily force the DO] to concentrate its limited resources on
cases where criminal charges are most likely to stick. Concerns for institutional reputation and the preservation of an amicable working relationship
with courts may also deter federal prosecutors from abusing their prosecutorial
discretion. Perhaps most important, the adversarial testing of federal prosecutions before impartial courts has a powerful sanitizing effect upon prosecutorial discretion, dramatically reducing the threat of arbitrary or vindictive
prosecutions. These checks do not necessarily guarantee that federal prosecutors will do their job well, but they do diminish the risk that they will squander public resources, arbitrarily single out individuals for investigation, or
abuse their discretion in pursuit of personal interest.
Few of these political and institutional constraints apply to an independent counsel or special counsel. Traditionally, the independent counsel's
purpose under the Ethics in Government Act was "to investigate, and, if
appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking Government officials for viola250
tions of federal criminallaws." An independent counsel could "be removed
from office, other than by impeachment and conviction, only by the personal
action of the Attorney General and only for good cause, physical or mental
disability or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of
251
Following the Ethics in Government
such independent counsel's duties."
Act's expiration in 1999, the DO] replaced the independent counsel with an
ad hoc special counsel. U.S. Attorney Patrick ]. Fitzgerald, the special
counsel currently investigating the leak of CIA agent Valerie Plame's
identity, "exercise[s] ... authority as Special Counsel independent of the
251
supervision or control of any officer of the Uustice] Department." In effect,
250.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988) .
251.
28 U.S.C. § 596(a). The attorney general must simultaneously file a report with the
Special Division and Congress "specifying the facts found and the ultimate grounds for such
removal," id. § 596(a)(2), and the independent counsel can obtain judicial review of his removal,
id. § 596(a)(3 ).
252.
Letter from James B. Corney, Acting Attorney Gen., to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S.
Attorney (Dec. 30, 2003) (on file with author); see also Letter from James B. Corney, Acting
Attorney Gen., to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney (Feb. 6, 2004) (on file with author) (clarifying
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the office of special counsel constitutes a miniature OOJ with only tenuous
ties to the White House. Barring extraordinary circumstances, an independent
or special counsel's tenure runs until he or she concludes that the investigation
.ts camp1ete. 211
In widely publicized investigations, a special counsel may face tremendous pressure to indict on insubstantial evidence or to use the prosecutorial
machinery as a partisan tool to embarrass and harass the object of investigation.214 Adversarial testing and jury deliberation arguably have a weaker salutary effect for special counsel investigations of high-level governmental
officials, because pre-indictment decisions regarding the investigation's scope
can deliver crippling political blows long before a grand jury or petit jury ever
enters the picture. Indeed, the dangers of prosecutorial discretion are particularly acute for independent and special-counsel investigations precisely
because the political costs associated with these investigations frequently
equal or exceed individual criminal penalties. In the eyes of many critics, this
combination of prosecutorial independence, discretion, and pressure to indict
211
makes the special counsel the poster child for agency illegitimacy.
Since the special counsel enjoys greater independence from presidential
control than regular federal prosecutors, ordinary due process restraints on
prosecutorial discretion may be insufficient to ensure fidelity to the purpose of

that the special counsel's authority over the investigation is plenary) ; 28 U.S.C. *§ 593, 594(a)
(providing for appointment of independent counsel by a panel of circuit court judges, and delegating
"full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and
powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or employee of
the Department of Justice").
See 28 U.S. C. § 596(b)( I )-(2); see also Morrison , 487 U.S. at 712-15 ( 1988) (Scalia, J.,
253.
dissenting) (asserting that this unconstrained discreticm comes ar a high financial and political cost).
254.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Learning the \XIrong Lessons from History: Why There Must Be
an Independent Counsel Law, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. I, 4 (2000) (mguing that Kenneth Starr's role
in the first Bush administration made it "inevitable" that the Monica Lewinsky investigation would
be viewed as a "partisan" vendetta).
255.
For representative criticism of the independent-counsel office, see , for example, Carter,
supra note 136, at 112-13 & n.27 (arguing that the independent counsel is accountable to no one
but itself) (citing Alexander M. Bickel, Alexander M . Bickel on the Special Prosecutor, YALE L. REP.,
Winter 1974, at 24); Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97
MICH. L. REV. 601 ( 1998); Ken Gormley, Impeachment and the Independent Counsel: A Dysfunctional
Union, 51 STAN. L. REV. 309 (1999); Thomas S. Martin & David E. Zerhusen, Independent
Counsel-Checks and Balances, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 536 ( 1990); see a lso David Jo hnston &
Neil A. Lewis, Inquiry on Clinton Official Ends with Accusations of Cover-up, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2006, at AI (observing that independent counsel David M. Barrett's investigation of former
Housing Secretary Henry G . Cisneros "lasted more than a decade, consumed some $21 million and
came to be a symbol of the flawed effort to prosecute high-level corruption through the use of
independent prosecutors").
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the special-counsel investigation.
Therefore, courts should take their cue
from private fiduciary law and hold that due process requires the special
counsel to meet a higher standard of care, loyalty, and transparency than rankand-file federal prosecutors. In addition, federal legislation or DO] regulations
could be adopted to ensure that each special counsel keeps detailed records,
makes targeted public disclosures, and provides the court and the target of
investigation with a reasoned explanation for key discretionary judgments,
such as the decision to focus an investigation on particular individuals or to
seek indictments for specific offenses. These discretionary decisions might then
be subject to challenge at trial under an "arbitrary-and-capricious" test or an
equivalent standard. If the record produced by the special counsel should
reveal that the investigatory process had been exploited for private or partisan
advantage, courts could dismiss the indictment as an abuse of discretion
pending the appointment of a new special counsel. These and other enhanced
restraints on the special counsel's exercise of discretion would help to
compensate for diminished political accountability by cementing the social
norms of rationality, impartiality, and transparency as effective constraints on
prosecutorial discretion.
In short, the fiduciary model strongly supports strengthening administrative agencies' constitutional and statutory duties of care, loyalty, and transparency to enhance agency legitimacy in contexts where the political
branches' residual control over agency performance is at its weakest. How

256.
Recognizing that prosecutorial discretion "carries with it the potential for both individual
and institutional abuse," Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978), courts apply the Due
Process Clause as a prohibition against vindictive, retaliatory, facially discriminatory, or other
flagrantly abusive exercises of prosecutorial discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 ,
842-43 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Prosecutors are expected to recuse
themselves from cases in which they have a personal interest. See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709,
713 (4th Cir. 1967) ("At common law, a prosecuting attorney 'is the representative of the public
in whom is lodged a discretion ... , which is not to be controlled by the courts or by an interested
individual."') (citation omitted). Due process also proscribes facially irrational or bad-faith exercises
of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972)
(holding that failure to disclose a promise of immunity to a cooperating witness requires
reversal); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963) (holding that suppression of material evidence
justifies a new trial "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"); Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (holding that due process violated "when the State, although not
soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears"); Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all . . . . It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one."). In practice, these constitutional restraints on prosecutorial discretion-which address
only the most egregious abuses-perform a function similar to the duties of care and loyalty in
private fiduciary law.
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administrative law should define and enforce these fiduciary duties in any
particular context will naturally depend upon a host of factors, not the least
of which are the scope of the agency's authority, residual political controls,
and social norms. The fiduciary model's overarching theme, however, is that
the political branches' residual control and agencies' duties of care and loyalty
are mutually reinforcing forces, which must be harmonized to realize administrative law's ultimate goal-agency fidelity.
CONCLUSION

This Article has excavated administrative law's fiduciary foundations to
explore how the rhetoric and theory of fiduciary obligation shape administrative law. The fiduciary model envisions administrative law as resting upon a
foundation of entrustment, residual control, and fiduciary duties. In contrast
to prevailing theories of administrative law such as the interest-representation
model and unitary-executive model, the fiduciary model does not pin its
hopes for agency fidelity on any single facet of the law, whether it be expertise, legislative delegation, executive control, interest representation, or procedural rationality. Instead, the fiduciary model incorporates each and every
one of these elements as mutually reinforcing supports in the administrative
state's open-textured legal architecture.
By the same token, the fiduciary model does not shy away from administrative agencies' diversity. While some agencies wield core executive powers
and perform roles akin to agents in private law, other agencies function more
like trustees, corporate directors, guardians, or other fiduciary relations. The fiduciary model shows that the diverse species of agency discretion reflect
competing visions of agency fidelity, from majoritarian pluralism to communitarian commitment reinforcement. Although the fiduciary model does not
dictate how policymakers should choose from among these competing visions,
it does furnish a useful conceptual framework for negotiating the enduring
tensions shared by all agencies-trust and distrust, legal rules and social norms,
public will and public interest, independence and accountability.
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